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PREFACE 
Railway signalling systems are complex control systems. As a result of the long railway histo-
ry, there are a lot of specific national solutions based on different technologies. The key to 
learn how signalling systems work is to understand the fundamental control principles these 
systems are based on. By definition, the signaling principles are the underlying principles of a 
signalling-based safeworking system that are based on the national standards but are inde-
pendent of the requirements of a specific railway operating company and of the technology 
used. 
This E-book explains the fundamental principles all railway signalling systems have in com-
mon. It is done in a generic way that does not focus on specific national solutions. The inten-
tion is to provide core knowledge of long-term value that will not be outdated just by the next 
generation of technology. The content of this E-book is based on the long-standing experi-
ence of teaching railway operations and signalling at universities and higher vocational train-
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6 Railway Signalling Principles 
 
1 BASIC ELEMENTS AND TERMS 
The purpose of signalling systems is to ensure safe movements of trains on a railway infra-
structure by locking movable track elements in a proper position, checking the clearance of 
track sections, locking out conflicting moves, and control train movements in a way to keep 
them safely apart. This first chapter describes the trackside elements controlled by signalling 
systems and explains the basic terms used in the operating procedures for the safe control of 
movements with railway vehicles on a railway infrastructure.    
1.1 Controlled Trackside Elements 
1.1.1 Movable Track Elements 
Turnouts 
A turnout is an assembly of rails, movable points, and a frog, which effect the tangential 




Figure 1.1  Components of a turnout 
 
The movability of the points is provided by using point blades made of flexible steel. In older 
installations, there are sometimes still turnouts at which the movability of the point blades is 
effected by bolted joints. The points may be operated manually or by a point machine. Point 
machines are either electric motor drives or electrically controlled pneumatic cylinder drives. 
In case of a small angle of divergence, a movable frog (also called ‘swing nose frog’) operat-
ed by an additional point machine could be provided. Movements on a turnout where the 
points face approaching traffic are called ‘facing point movements’ whereas movements in 
which the frog faces approaching traffic are called ‘trailing point movements’ (Figure 1.2).  
The angle of divergence is not stated in degrees but either by its tangent written as a frac-
tion, e.g., 1 : 12, or by the so-called turnout or frog number, which is the reciprocal of that 
fraction. So, a 1 : 12 angle equals a frog number 12. The limit of occupation of the conver-
ging tracks is called ‘the fouling point’. Many railways mark this limit with a trackside fouling 
point indicator.  
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Figure 1.2  Movements on points 
 
Note: The term turnout is mostly used in civil engineering. In railway operation and signalling, 
a turnout is usually referred to as a pair of points (points in short), although this term in its 
original meaning only applies to the part of a turnout where the points are located. This part 
of a turnout is also known as a switch. In North American railway operation and signalling, 
turnouts are usually referred to as switches (Armstrong, 2008; Bisset et. al., 2008; White, 
2003). Consequently, the point machine is also called a switch machine. 
In British civil engineering terms, points are also often referred to as switches. There, an en-
tire turnout is called a 'switch and crossing', using the term 'crossing' for the frog part of the 
turnout. This differs from the terms in railway operation and signalling, where the term points 








Figure 1.4  Single and double slips 
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Crossings 
A crossing is an assembly of rails that effects two tracks to cross at grade. Like points, cross-
ings are equipped with fouling point indicators. The inner part of a crossing is called a ‘dia-
mond’. Crossings with a large angle of intersection are designed rigidly. In case of a small 
angle of intersection (usually less than 1 : 9), fixed diamond frogs are replaced by movable 
points (‘switch diamond’, Figure 1.3).  
Small angle crossings may be equipped with additional points providing a slip connection to 
permit movements from one track to another. A crossing with a slip connection at one side is 
called a ‘single slip’, and a crossing with slip connections at both sides is called a ‘double 
slip’ (Figures 1.4). In the North American terms, crossings with slip connections are called 
slip switches.  
Derailers 
Derailers (called derails in the North American terms) are trackside devices that are used to 
protect train movements against unattended movements of vehicles on converging tracks. 
An unsafe movement will be derailed before it could join the protected route. In the protecting 
position, a derailing piece is raised over one rail. Like points, derailers can be hand or power 
operated. On many railways, derailers must not be installed outside of sidings (see Section 
1.2). Instead of derailers, some railways also use trap points, which have quite the same 
effect. 
1.1.2 Lineside Signals 
While being gradually replaced by advanced radio-based train control systems, in which 
trains are guided by cab signal indications, lineside signals are still the most common tech-
nology for controlling train movements. On railways where train movements are strongly 
separated from shunting movements (see Section 1.2), which is the case on most railways 
outside North America, there are usually also two basic kinds of lineside signals: 
Main signals 
Main signals authorise a regular train movement to enter a line section. In this tutorial, the 
term main signal is used in a generic way for all signals controlling regular train movements, 
no matter, whether or not an individual railway would separate these signals from shunting 
signals. The movement authority provided by a main signal is limited by the next main signal 
or a point specified in the operating rules.  
Apart from lines with a low speed, a signal that authorises a train movement requires an ap-
proach aspect at the braking distance in approach to the signal because the stopping dis-
tance is generally greater than the range of vision. The approach aspect is necessary for a 
safe braking when approaching a stop signal. On lines where the distance between signals 
does not significantly exceed the braking distance, the approach aspect is usually provided 
by the signal in rear. On lines with very long distances between main signals, distant signals 
are placed at the braking distance in approach to a main signal. A distant signal can only 
provide an approach aspect for the signal ahead but it cannot show a stop aspect. Another 
common term for a distant signal used in the rulebooks of some railways is warner signal 
(Chandra & Agarwal 2008). 
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On North American lines, there is a general lack of distant signals. On signalled tracks, the 
approach indication is always provided by the block signal in rear, regardless of block length. 
Distant signals are only used in approach to an interlocking area on a non-signalled track. 
Shunting signals 
Shunting signals are used to authorise shunting movements and to protect trains against 
shunting movements. On most railways, the stop aspect of a main signal also applies for 
shunting movements. On tracks where shunting movements may pass main signals, a shunt 
aspect is incorporated in the main signal, so that shunting movements may be authorised to 
pass main signals in stop position. For shunting signals, an approach aspect is not provided 
because shunting movements run at a very low speed that allows the driver to stop short of 
any vehicle or obstruction.  
On some railways, the stop aspect of shunting signals is absolute, i.e., it indicates stop for all 
kinds of movements. Such shunting signals must also be cleared for train movements au-
thorised by a main signal. Movements running under authority of a main signal may pass 
cleared shunting signals at the speed authorised by the main signal or the timetable. Some 
railways use shunting signals with a shunting stop aspect that does not apply to train move-
ments. This is typical for several East European, Russian, and Chinese railways where a 
blue light is used for this purpose. On those railways, movements running under authority of 
a main signal may ignore the stop aspects of shunting signals. 
On railways that do not use the distinction between main and shunting signals, there is a 
signal aspect that authorises a movement to pass a signal cautiously on sight prepared to 
stop short of any vehicle or obstruction. That aspect is used both for shunting purposes but 
also to authorise train movements to enter a section that may be occupied.  
Concerning the control principle, there is a distinction between controlled and automatic sig-
nals. Controlled signals are all signals that protect track sections that contain movable track 
elements or points where conflicts with movements on conflicting routes may occur. The 
normal position of controlled signals is stop. To clear a controlled signal, a route is set in the 
control system that will lock all movable track elements in the proper position and lock out all 
conflicting moves. The route setting may be initiated by a human operator or an automatic 
route setting system. If route setting is automated, the signals are still referred to as con-
trolled signals.  
Automatic signals work automatically by the passage of the train through track sections. 
They are forced to stop position by track clear detection devices if the section beyond the 
signal is occupied. Automatic signals can only be used to protect track sections that do nei-
ther contain any movable track elements nor points where conflicts with movements on con-
flicting routes may occur. Depending on the type of control system, the normal position of 
automatic signals may be stop or clear. 
1.1.3 Track Clear Detection 
The purpose of track clear detection devices is to check that all relevant track sections are 
clear of vehicles before a train may be authorised to pass through a route. There are two 
types of track clear detection devices: track circuits and axle counters. 
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Track circuits 
A track circuit is an electrical circuit of which the rails of a section form a part. It usually has a 
source of current at one end and a detection device at the other. Sections are divided by 
insulated rail joints (Figure 1.5). 
If the section is occupied by a vehicle, the axles produce a short circuit by shunting the two 
rails. As a result, the detection device does not receive any current and therefore it detects 
the section as occupied. The detection device is often implemented by a track relay, which is 
in a picked up position when the section is clear and dropped when the section is occupied. 
In modern installations, the relay is often replaced by an electronic detector. Since a track 
circuit is based on the closed circuit principle, any interruption of the current will lead to a 
safe state by making the section occupied.  
The maximum working length of a track circuit is limited by the resistance between the two 
rails. Track circuit sections cannot be made much longer than about 2 km. Also, non-
shunting vehicles and situations in which the safe working is limited by rusty or dirty rails re-
quire specific operating procedures. 
 
Figure 1.5  Track circuit 
 
Non-shunting vehicles are vehicles that are not safely detected by track circuits, since they 
do not produce a reliable electrical connection between the rails. A range of maintenance 
and inspection vehicles fall into this category. Track circuits occupied by non-shunting vehi-
cles must be protected under staff responsibility by securing protective signals in stop posi-
tion. If the rails of a track circuit section are heavily rusted, even regular vehicles will no long-
er safely be detected. That is, why most railways established the rule that there must be a 
minimum number of movements within a specified period of time to keep the track circuits 
safe. A typical rule is one movement per day. If there was no movement within that period, 
the next move to enter that section must be made on sight unless the clearance of the sec-
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tion can be checked by other means. The rails of a track circuit section must also be kept 
clean, since heavy dirt may have the same effect as rust. 
On electrified lines, the rails are used as a return for the traction current. Therefore, adjacent 
track circuits must be electrically connected to allow the traction current to pass the insulated 
rail joints. The simplest solution is providing a common rail by single-rail track circuits. To 
provide better protection against parasitic currents in case of an accidentally shunted insulat-
ed rail joint, joints are often provided in both rails using cross bonds to connect the track cir-
cuits (Figure 1.6). This way, the return of the traction current changes to the other rail at insu-
lated rail joints.  
On most railways, single-rail track circuits are only used for short track circuits, e.g., within 
point zones, but not for track clear detection of longer sections. Track circuits for longer 
stretches of track require a better protection against parasitic currents. For this purpose, 
double-rail track circuits are used. The electrical connection for the return of the traction cur-
rent is achieved by so-called impedance bonds (Figure 1.7).  
 
 





Figure 1.7  Impedance bonds 
 
In its most simple form, at both sides of the insulated rail joints, a coil is placed between the 
two rails of the track. The coils are connected by a centre connector that divides each coil 
into two halves. The traction current enters the coil from each rail, and leaves the coil through 
the centre connection, passing through the opposing coil into the rails of the next section. In 
this way, two opposing magnetic fields are produced, one in each half of each coil, which are 
balanced in strength and neutralise each other. By using AC track circuits, the impedance 
will prevent the coil from shunting the track circuit. In a modified version, transformers are 
used instead of single coils. Both the source of the traction current and the track relay are no 
longer directly connected to the rails but via these transformers. Since, as explained above, 
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the opposing magnetic fields produced by the traction current in the trackside coils equalise 
each other, they will not cause inductive currents in the coil connected to the track relay. 
Some railways (e.g., in Switzerland) use digitally coded track circuits in which the track relay 
is replaced by an electronic device. With this technology, single-rail track circuits with joints in 
only one rail may be used for sections of any length. This eliminates the need for impedance 
bonds.   
There are also jointless track circuits, also known as audio frequency track circuits. These 
are specific track circuits that work with an audio frequency AC track current. Due to the in-
ductive and capacitive track characteristics, the working length of such a track circuit would 
limit itself. For a safe continuous track clear detection, the adjacent track circuits must over-
lap each other. A controlled overlapping of adjacent track circuits can be achieved by S-
shaped rail connectors (Figure 1.8). There are also jointless track circuits that provide a con-




Figure 1.8  S-shaped connector to separate jointless track circuits 
 
Axle counters 
An axle counter is a system consisting of counting points at the boundaries of a section and 
a counter connected to the counting points (Figure 1.9). The occupancy of a section is de-
tected by comparing the number of axles that enter the section with the number of axles that 
leave the section. To give a clear indication, the parity of numbers is necessary. Counting 
points are usually made up of double contacts to detect the direction of movement. This is 




Figure 1.9  Axle counter 
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In contrast to track circuits, the maximum working length is not limited. There are also no 
problems with non-shunting vehicles or rust or dirt on the rails.  
1.2 Basic Operating Terms 
Classification of Tracks 
In railway operations, a track is often also referred to as a line. A route consisting of just one 
track is called a single line, while a route with double track operation, i.e., two parallel tracks 
and a specified direction for normal moves on both tracks is called a double line. For opera-
tional purposes, tracks are divided into two main classes. While they that are called different-
ly in the rulebooks of individual railways, the basic idea is always the same: 
 Tracks that may be used for regular train movements 
 Tracks that must only be used for shunting movements 
The distinction between train and shunting moves is explained later in this section. The 
tracks used for regular train movements are called main tracks or running lines. The term 
main track is mainly used in North America, but was also adopted by some railways outside 
North America. It is also used in some international textbooks (Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020). 
Many other railways, in particular railways with roots in the British systems, prefer the term 
running line. The lines between stations and their continuation through stations and interlock-
ing areas belong into this category. It also includes tracks for passing and overtaking trains 
which are called loops on most railways (Figure 1.10). On signalled lines, tracks used for 
train movements are equipped with signalling appliances for the safe passage of trains. 
Along the line a train passes through, points are usually interlocked with signals that provide 
the movement authority. Sidings are all tracks that must only be used for shunting move-




Figure 1.10  Classification of tracks 
 
Note: In the North American terms, a line is a route that may consist of several parallel 
tracks. Furthermore, loops are called sidings; tracks other than main tracks are called yard, 
secondary, or industrial tracks. Single-end tracks connected to a main track are called spur 
tracks.  
Block Sections 
A line with a fixed block system is divided into block sections for the purpose of safe train 
separation. A train must generally not enter a block section until it has been cleared by the 
train ahead. On lines with lineside signals, block sections are limited by signals, which gov-
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202006161443-0
14 Railway Signalling Principles 
 
ern train movements. A signal that limits a block section outside a station area is called a 
block signal. While the basic idea of train separation by fixed sections also applies on station 
tracks, many railways that separate the station areas from the open line (see following para-
graph on interlocking areas) use the term block section only outside of station areas.   
Interlocking Areas 
An interlocking area is a track area, where controlled signals are interlocked with points and 
other signals in a way that a signal can only be cleared when all points are locked in the 
proper position and all conflicting moves are locked out. Signals that govern interlocked 
routes are called interlocking signals. The points and signals are controlled either by a local 
interlocking station or from a remote control centre. Local interlocking stations are called 
interlocking towers in North America, and signal boxes or signal cabins on most other 
railways. A locally staffed interlocking station contains both the interlocking system and the 
user interface for the operator. Modern interlocking systems are usually remote controlled 
from a control centre.  
There are two basic signal arrangements in interlocking areas (Figure 1.11). First, there are 
interlocking areas without consecutive interlocking signals. An interlocking signal provides 
authority to run through the entire interlocking area into the next block section. Second, there 




Figure 1.11  Types of interlocking areas 
 
Such an interlocking area may contain tracks protected by controlled signals on which trains 
may originate, terminate, pass, and turn. In this tutorial, these tracks are called station tracks. 
Consequently, an arrangement of station tracks is called a station area. Also, in this tutorial, 
the tracks outside the opposing interlocking signals limiting the station area are called the 
open line. The terms station area and open line are used here in a generic way not referring 
to the practice of an individual railway. Due to the big variety of operating principles used 
worldwide, terms used in the rulebooks of individual railways may differ.   
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A station platform for scheduled stops of passenger trains is not necessarily associated with 
a station track in the sense as defined above, which needs not have a platform. There are 
also platform stations on the open line, which do not necessarily imply any provision of 
pointwork or the ability to reverse trains within the signalling system.  
On most railways, the interlocking signals protecting a station area from both sides are called 
home signals. The interlocking signals that govern train movements to leave a station track 
into a section of the open line are often called station exit signals or just exit signals. These 
terms are also used in this tutorial. Other commonly used terms for these signals are section 
signals, starter signals, or leaving signals. Interlocking signals within the station area that are 
neither home nor exit signals are called intermediate interlocking signals (Figure 1.12). On 
some railways, they are also called inner home signals (when passed by arriving trains) and 




Figure 1.12  Station area with intermediate interlocking signals 
 
In North America, interlocking areas with consecutive interlocking signals within the same 
interlocking limits are not common. The reason is that the distinction between station tracks 
and tracks of the open line does not exist in the North American rules (Bisset et. al., 2008). In 
Europe and most other railways outside of North America, station areas with consecutive 
interlocking signals are very common. In modern British signalling centres, there is also no 
longer any formal distinction between station tracks and sections of the open line. However, 
interlocking areas may contain consecutive interlocking signals. So, in a generic way, the 
terms used here will also fit to the British system.  
Movements with Railway Vehicles 
On most railways, the normal train movements are separated from the so-called shunting 
movements. In North America, the rules for both kinds of movements do not differ as signifi-
cantly as in most other countries. That is the reason why in North American operations, as 
mentioned above, shunting signals are not used.   
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Train movements, also known as 'running movements', are movements of locomotives or 
self-propelled vehicles, alone or coupled to one or more vehicles, with authority to occupy a 
section of line under operating conditions specified in the operating rules. Every train dis-
plays rear end markers (tail lights or marker boards) to enable the lineside staff to check the 
train completeness. All regular movements running along the line from station to station are 
train movements. 
The authorisation of a train movement has two elements: 
 A valid timetable as the authority to run through the network along a pre-defined route 
by specified operating conditions (timetable authority) 
 A movement authority for every single section of track in the path of the train 
The movement authority to enter a section of track is issued by the operator who is in charge 
of controlling train movements on that section of track. This way, a train is always under ex-
ternal guidance of a train control operator. The authority for train movements is given by: 
 A proceed indication of a main signal 
 A proceed indication of a cab signal display 
 A call-on signal permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop aspect under spe-
cial conditions 
 A written or verbal instruction permitting a train to pass a signal displaying a stop as-
pect under special conditions 
 A written or verbal authority on non signal-controlled lines 
Shunting movements are movements for making up trains, moving vehicles from one track to 
another, and similar purposes. Shunting movements are accomplished without a timetable 
under simplified conditions at a very low speed that allows the driver to stop short of any ve-
hicle or obstruction. On main tracks and on sidings controlled by an interlocking station or 
control centre, a verbal agreement between the shunting crew and the operator is needed 
before the operator may authorise the shunting move. That verbal agreement performs a 
similar function as the timetable authority for train movements. Block rules are not in effect. 
Shunting units may enter occupied tracks. Movements in industrial sidings are also carried 
out as shunting movements.   
The authority of shunting movements is given by: 
 A proceed indication of a shunting signal, which may be combined with a main signal 
to authorise a shunting move to pass the main signal in stop position 
 Verbal permission 
In the North American terms, the term shunting is not used.  Shunting  movements are called 
‘switching movements’ or ‘movements of yard engines’. 
Concerning shunting movements, the railways designated different limits in accordance with 
their individual operating practice.  
On European railways, apart from modern British rules, shunting units must not enter line 
sections outside the home signal limits of a station area. The same rule also applies on many 
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railways outside Europe. The area between the home signals that may be used for shunting 




Figure 1.13  Shunting limits of a station area 
 
The distance between the home signal and the LOS board equals the overlap of the home 
signal. Shunting units may pass the shunting limit boards only with a written permission from 
the operator. Before issuing authority to a shunting unit to pass the shunting limit board, the 
operator has to make sure that there is no train approaching the home signal.  
While in modern British railway operations, the formal distinction between station areas and 
the open line doesn’t exist, shunting units must be prevented from entering a section on 
which they are not protected against opposing movements. If no main or shunting signal ex-
ists to limit the shunting move, limit of shunt signals are placed at the shunting limit. These 
LOS signals are inoperative shunting signals permanently displaying a stop aspect.  
Double Track Operations 
For double track operation, there is usually a specified direction of traffic for each track. 
While right-track operation dominates slightly worldwide, there is a significant number of 
countries where left-track operation is the standard form. On lines not equipped with a bidi-
rectional signalling system for two-way working, all regular train movements have to be made 
with the normal direction of traffic. On such lines, movements against the normal direction 
(also called ‘wrong line moves’ or ‘reverse movements’) have to be authorised by special 
instructions under staff responsibilty. On lines that are equipped with a signalling system for 
two-way working, movements against the normal direction can be authorised by clearing a 
main signal.  
Many railways do not install intermediate block signals for reverse movements because on 
most lines, reverse movements are not carried out frequently. For temporary single track 
working is case of a track closure, the direction on the remaining track will change after al-
most every train. So, intermediate block signals would have no effect on capacity. Intermedi-
ate block signals for movements against the normal direction do only make sense on sec-
tions, where parallel moves on both lines are carried out on a regular basis.  
Figure 1.14 shows typical examples of signal arrangements for double track operation. On 
many railways, a normal direction of traffic is only in effect outside of station areas.  
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2 SPACING TRAINS 
In a steel wheel on steel rail system, the static friction coefficient is on average eight times 
less than in road traffic. As a result, the maximum braking force that can be transmitted be-
tween wheel and rail for a given weight is also eight times less. That leads to braking dis-
tances for railway vehicles that may exceed the viewing range of the driver significantly. 
Thus, train separation cannot simply be based on the viewing range but has to be controlled 
by trackside technology. 
2.1 Theory of Train Separation 
There are three basic theoretical principles of train separation: 
 Relative braking distance  
 Absolute braking distance 
 Fixed block distance 
Relative Braking Distance 
In relative braking distance mode, the distance between two following trains equals the dif-
ference of the braking distances of the trains plus an additional safety margin. For the head-
way (‘head-to-head’) distance between two trains following each other, the length of the first 
train has to be added (Figure 2.1 a). The braking distances of both trains have either to be 
calculated with braking curves based on the same deceleration rate, or by applying the rule 
that in case of a better braking performance of the second train, a minimum safety margin 
must always be kept between the two trains.  
While relative braking distance leads to a maximum of line capacity, there are two essential 
problems. When points are to be moved between two trains, the second train cannot follow 
at relative braking distance but must be kept at full braking distance in approach to the points 
until the points are safely locked in the new position. As a result, the line capacity is limited 
by the point zones where successive trains may take different routes. Another problem is that 
in case of an accident of the first train, the second train has no chance to stop and is going to 
collide with the first train. For these problems, this principle has not yet applied for train sepa-
ration but is used by some freight railways for processing the coupling and uncoupling of 
helper locomotives on the move. 
Absolute Braking Distance 
Absolute braking distance leads to a distance between two following trains that equals the 
braking distance of the second train plus an additional safety margin. For the minimum 
headway, the length of the first train has to be added (Figure 2.1 b). 
Train separation by absolute braking distance is often seen as the best suited principle of 
train separation. The only problem that has so far prevented the introduction of this principle 
outside of mass transit systems is the lack of a usable technology for on-board checking of 
train completeness (train integrity) of freight trains, which is needed for safe location of the 
train’s rear end. However, with the further development of radio-based operating techno-
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logies, train separation by absolute braking distance may be widely introduced in the near 




Figure 2.1  Principles of train separation  
 
Fixed Block Distance 
In a fixed block system, the line is divided into consecutive block sections. A block section 
may be exclusively occupied by only one train at a time. The distance between two following 
trains equals the braking distance of the second train plus the length of the block section plus 
an additional safety margin. Thus, the headway distance equals the headway of absolute 
braking distance plus the length of the block section (Figure 2.1 c). While the minimum 
headway of a fixed block system exceeds the minimum headway of a moving block system, 
the capacity limiting effect of the block sections is often overrated.  
In train control with lineside signals, the block sections are limited by signals. Nowadays, 
running in fixed block distance is the most common principle of train separation worldwide.  
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2.2 Train Control Principles 
The principle used for safe train separation depends on the following criteria: 
 How movement authority is transmitted from track to train 
 How the track is released behind a train 
If movement authority is only transmitted at discrete points, e. g. at lineside signals, this will 
necessarily lead to a fixed block system. Each movement authority has to cover the entire 
section up to the next point at which further authority may be received. On lines where trains 
are governed continuously by a cab signal system, this restriction does not exist. However, 
continuous transmission of movement authority is not yet a sufficient criterion to abolish fixed 
block sections. In addition, the train has to release the track not in fixed intervals but continu-
ously. This requires a permanent train-borne checking of train completeness. Since for tradi-
tional railway systems, a sufficient solution for that problem has not yet been found, train 
separation at a fixed block distance is still the standard principle for safe train spacing on 
most railways worldwide. 
Before explaining the different principles of train separation, another essential feature has to 
be mentioned. The braking distance of a train does not mainly depend on the weight of the 
train but on the percentage of the weight that is used to transmit braking force between 
wheel and rail. Trains with the same braking ratio have generally the same braking distance. 
For safe train separation, a train must always have a clear track ahead at least as long as the 
braking distance. Thus, from the viewpoint of capacity, it makes sense to assemble vehicles 
into trains. All vehicles that form a train do need just one common braking distance for the 
entire consist. This will significantly reduce the capacity consumption that is produced by the 
long braking distances. This is why running whole trains instead of single vehicles is one of 
the very basic characteristics of a railway system. 
2.2.1 Train Control by Lineside Signals 
Guiding Trains in Fixed Block Operation 
While, with the introduction of radio-based train control system, railways move more and 
more toward cab signalling, lineside signals are still the dominating from of train control. They 
are even used in many new installations. Since lineside signals can only transmit movement 
authorities at fixed intervals, train control by lineside signals always leads to a fixed block 
operation. For this, the line is divided into block sections limited by signals. To clear a signal 
for a train that is to enter a block section, the following conditions must have been fulfilled 
(Figure 2.2): 
 The train ahead must have cleared the block section 
 The train ahead must have cleared the overlap beyond the next signal (only on lines 
where block overlaps are used) 
 The train ahead must be protected by a stop signal 
On lines with bidirectional operation, the train must also be protected against opposing 
movements. 
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Figure 2.2  Control length of signals on a fixed block line 
 
The control length of a signal is the length of track beyond a signal that must be safe and 
clear to enable that signal to be cleared. When overlaps are used, the control length exceeds 
the length of the block section and overlaps with the control length of the next signal. The 
main purpose of the overlap is to provide additional safety in case a train overruns a stop 
signal by a short distance due to bad brake handling. A signal must not be cleared until the 
full control length is clear. Thus, the clearing point beyond a signal equals the end of the con-
trol length of the signal in rear. Some railways do not use overlaps. In that case, the control 
length of a signal equals the block length.  
Lineside Signal Indications 
Lineside signals provide information both for safe train separation but also for guiding trains 
through point zones. Concerning the classification of signal aspects, these systems can be 
divided in two basic principles of signalling: 
 Speed signalling 
 Route signalling 
In a speed signalling system, the signals indicate the speed not to be exceeded by a train. In 
route signalling, the facing point signals indicate the route over which the train is being sent. 
In route signalling, the driver must know the speed limit of every route the train may run over. 
While systems follow the speed signalling principle, route signalling is also still quite com-
mon, in particular on railways with roots in the British system.  
In some systems, the speed or route information is part of the block signal aspect e.g., by 
using combinations of different lights. Other systems, in particular modern European installa-
tions, use supplementary speed or route indicators. In such systems, the block signal itself 
gives only information about the occupation of the following block sections. So the block sig-
nal aspects can be designed in a very simple form. 
For train separation, most railways use three basic indications, usually displayed by a red, 
yellow, and green aspect. That’s why, such a system is also known as three-aspect sig-
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nalling. Since different names are used for these indications in the rulebooks of individual 
railways, the generic terms as stated in Table 1 are used here. 
Table 1  Basic signal indications 
Stop Train must stop at the signal 
Expect stop Train may proceed with caution prepared to stop at the signal ahead 
Clear Train may proceed 
 
Regarding the principle of providing the approach indication there are two kinds of signalling 
(Figure 2.3): 
 One-block signalling 
 Multiple-block signalling 
In one-block signalling (Figure 2.3 a), the indication of a main signal depends only on the 
state of the block section beyond the signal. A main signal cannot provide any approach in-
formation for the next signal. So, every main signal must have a distant signal whose only 
purpose it is to provide the required approach indication. The distant signal is placed at the 
braking distance in approach to the main signal. On lines with short block sections that do 
not significantly exceed the braking distance, the distant signal is placed at the main signal in 
rear. In such systems, the head of a main signal and the head of the distant signal for the 
next main signal are often mounted one above the other on the same mast.  
In multiple-block signalling, the indication of a main signal depends on the state of two or 
more following block sections. Very common is two-block signalling in which the approach 
indication is given by the aspect of the rear main signal without need for separate distant 
signals (Figure 2.3 b). Since two-block signalling uses the same three basic signal aspects 
as one-block signalling, both principles fall into the category of ‘three-aspect signalling’.  
Multiple-block signalling renders a very efficient signalling but requires block sections not 
much longer than the stopping distance. On lines with very long block sections, multiple-
block signalling is not useful because approach indication given too early will reduce the ca-
pacity of the line by increasing the the signal headway of following trains. Many modern sig-
nal systems may be alternatively used with one-block or multiple-block signalling depending 
on the actual block length. 
Some railways even use three-block signalling in which a main signal provides information 
on three block sections ahead by using an advance approach indication (Figure 2.3 c). For 
this, a forth signal aspect is used telling the driver to be prepared to stop at the second signal 
ahead. That is, why such a system is called four-aspect signalling. By three-block signalling, 
the braking distance may exceed the block length enabling signals to be placed at shorter 
intervals to improve capacity. On railways that use speed signalling, the same effect can be 
achieved by progressive speed signalling (Figure 2.4).  
In progressive speed signalling, a train approaching a stop signal is progressively slowed 
down by speed indications. So, the maximum speed at which the train may pass the last sig-
nal in approach to a stop signal will ensure a safe braking within the short block section. Alt-
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hough more than three signal aspects are used (mostly four aspects but in some installations 
even more), it is only a two-block signalling system because an approach information is only 
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Figure 2.4 Progressive speed signalling 
 
A very common application of short block sections are moving-up signals at platform stations 
of mass transit railways (also known as staggered or multiple home signals). The purpose of 
these signals is to save time between the departure of one train and the arrival of the next 
train at the same platform track. The moving-up signal is placed beyond the station entrance 
signal directly at the platform. Thus the station entrance signal and the moving-up signal form 
a very short block section. The control length of the station entrance signal leads up to the 




Figure 2.5  Moving-up signal 
 
During a platform stop, a train is protected by two stop signals, since it occupies the control 
length of both the station entrance signal and of the moving-up signal. When a departing 
trains has cleared the control length of the station entrance signal (position 1 in Figure 2.5), a 
following train may already move up toward the platform while the departing train is still pro-
tected by the moving-up signal. The moving-up signal clears after the train has completely 
left the station section (position 2 in Figure 2.5). At stations with a very high density of traffic, 
multiple moving-up signals may be applied (but hardly more than four). Some railways even 
place moving-up signals in the middle of the platform.  
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The Blocking Time Model 
For the non-delayed passage of trains, a signal must be cleared before an approaching train 
is forced into a brake application by the aspect of the signal in rear. The minimum headway 
between two following trains depends on the so-called ‘blocking time’ (Hansen & Pachl 2014, 
Pachl 2018).  
 
 
Figure 2.6  Blocking time of a block section 
 
The blocking time (from the German term ‘Sperrzeit’) is the time interval in which a section of 
track (usually a block section) is allocated exclusively to a train and therefore blocked to oth-
er trains. The blocking time lasts from the latest possible time movement authority to enter 
the section has to be issued by clearing a signal without delaying the train up to the time at 
which movement authority to another train to enter the same section can be issued. So, the 
blocking time describes the time window that has to be kept clear for the non-delayed pas-
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sage of a train through a track section. While it is explained here for a lineside signalling sys-
tem, the idea behind the blocking time model is universal and can also be applied to cab sig-
nalling systems and to automatic train operations. As explained in section 2.2.2, it even 
works for moving block systems. 
The blocking time of a track section is usually much longer than the time the train occupies 
that section. In train control with lineside signals, for a train without a scheduled stop, the 
blocking time of a block section consists of the following time intervals (Figure 2.6): 
 The time for clearing the signal 
 The signal watching time, i.e., a certain time for the driver to watch the clear aspect at 
the signal that gives the approach indication for the signal at the entrance of the block 
section (this can be the block signal in rear or a separate distant signal) 
 The approach time between the signal that provides the approach indication and the 
signal at the entrance of the block section 
 The time between the block signals 
 The clearing time to completely clear the block section and – if required – the overlap  
 The release time to ‘unlock’ the block section 
The approach time equals the time the signal has to be cleared ahead of a train to prevent 
this train from passing an aspect at the signal in rear that will force the train into a brake ap-
plication. It does not apply if the train has a scheduled stop at the signal at the entrance of 




Figure 2.7  Blocking time stairway 
 
Drawing the blocking times of all block sections a train passes into a time-over-distance dia-
gram leads to the so-called ‘blocking time stairway’ (Figure 2.7). The blocking time stairway 
represents perfectly the operational use of a line by a train. Computer-generated blocking 
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time stairways are a typical feature of advanced scheduling systems to establish conflict-free 
train paths.  
By means of the blocking time stairways, it is possible to determine the minimum headway 
between two trains. The blocking times directly establish the signal headway as the minimum 
time interval between two following trains in each block section. The line headway is the min-
imum headway between two trains not only considering one block section but the whole 
blocking time stairways of the line (Figure 2.8). In this case, the blocking time stairways of 
two following trains touch each other without any tolerance in at least one block section (the 




Figure 2.8  Signal headway and line headway 
 
On lines with mixed traffic, the minimum line headway depends significantly on the speed 
differences between trains. On lines where all trains run at quite the same speed (typical on 
mass transit railways), the critical block sections are usually the block sections in which the 
blocking time includes the dwell time of platform stops (station sections, Figure 2.9). On such 
lines, signals should be placed in a way that keeps the blocking time of the station sections 
as short as possible. 
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Figure 2.9  Blocking time stairways on a mass transit railway 
 
The Protected Zone Model 
The protected zone model is an alternative approach to model the effect, the signalling sys-
tem has on the spacing of trains. The term ‘protected zone model’ was first used in (Pachl, 
2018). The basic idea is that behind every train, the signalling system provides a certain 
zone to protect that train against following trains. The protected zone can be divided into two 
parts (Figure 2.10 a). First, there is a part of absolute protection, which is marked by red col-
our. This part consists of all track sections the protected train has exclusive authority to oc-
cupy. This is the zone protected by a stop signal. Second, there is a part in which other trains 
are forced to slow down to prevent them from running into the part of absolute protection. 
That zone starts at the first restrictive signal encountered by a following train. In the diagram, 
this part is marked by yellow colour. The protected zone reaches its greatest length when a 
train is going to clear a block section (Figure 2.10 b). After the train has cleared the block 
section, the protected zone has its shortest length and starts to grow again (Figure 2.10 c).  
The change from the situation of Figure 2.10 b to the situation of Figure 2.10 c represents a 
single ‘step’ in the blocking time stairway. While diagramming the protected zones with addi-
tional times for operating and watching the signals along the path of a train movements 
would lead to picture similar to a blocking time stairway, there is one essential shortcoming. 
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Figure 2.10  The protected zone model 
 
Because the approach time is not added at the beginning but at the end of the occupation of 
the block section, the protected zone model cannot handle cab signalling systems in which 
the signalled braking distance depends on the actual speed of a train. In such systems, a 
train can only calculate its own braking distance but not the braking distance for a following 
train.  
2.2.2 Train Control by Cab Signalling 
In cab signalling, the movement authority is directly displayed on the driver’s desk. On most 
railways that use cab signalling, it is combined with a continuous Automatic Train Protection 
(ATP) system that provides the control data for the cab signals. While cab signalling allows 
the infrastructure operator to remove lineside signals completely, cab signalling may also be 
used as an overlay system on lines equipped with lineside signals, so trains may be con-
trolled either by cab signals or lineside signals. To avoid confusion for the driver, most rail-
ways established the rule that on such lines, cab signal indications are always superior to 
lineside signals.  
On some railways, there are still older cab signal systems in use that work only as auxiliary 
systems. On such lines, trains are still governed by lineside signals, but the cab signal indica-
tions support the driver in watching the lineside aspects. 
Cab signalling with fixed block sections 
The main reason for having fixed block sections on lines with cab signalling is the need for 
checking of train completeness by track clear detection technology. This is the case on all 
lines with freight traffic, since a sufficient solution for checking train completeness of freight 
trains does not yet exist. As an approved technology, it is also used on many lines with ex-
clusive passenger operations. On cab signaling lines without lineside signals, most railways 
use block marker boards to mark the block limits for degraded mode operations.  
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Sometimes, block sections are also used on cab signal controlled lines with exclusive pas-
senger operations where train completeness is checked on board without track clear detec-
tion technology. That principle is called virtual block, because the block sections exist only 
virtually in the control system without any field installations along the line. The reason for 
having virtual block sections instead of moving block is to reduce the amount of data trans-
mission by radio. In contrast to a moving block system where the continuous upgrade of the 
movement authority requires data transmission at very short intervals, the movement authori-
ty of a virtual block system is only upgraded after the train ahead has cleared a block section. 
This significantly reduces the data traffic from track to train. If capacity needs to be improved, 





Figure 2.11  Blocking time of a block section on a cab signaling line  
 
The main difference of cab signalling with fixed block sections from a fixed block system with 
lineside signals is the independence from the approach distance of the lineside signal sys-
tem, which is the distance between the signal at the entrance of the block section and the 
signal in rear that provides the approach indication. The approach time is no longer the run-
ning time between these two signals but the running time within the real braking distance 
based on the supervision curves of the cab signal system. Also, due to the absence of line-
side signals, a signal watching time to spot a signal aspect at a specific location is no longer 
needed. The other elements of the blocking time do not differ from a system with lineside 
signals (Figure 2.11). 
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Cab Signalling with Moving Block 
Moving block is based on absolute braking distance. Since the fixed block sections are elimi-
nated, the line is cleared continuously behind the rear end of a moving train. Beside a con-
tinuous detection of the train location and train completeness, it also requires a continuous 
upgrade of the movement authority. Figure 2.12 demonstrates the effect on the minimum 




 Figure 2.12  Headway in cab signaling with fixed block and moving block 
  
Today, moving block is only used in some transit systems. One reason why the interest of 
standard railways in moving block is rather limited is that the potential improvement of line 
capacity by the introduction of moving block is often overrated. On a moving block line, the 
length of the block sections is reduced to zero. That means that the running time within the 
block sections will be eliminated in the blocking time diagram. All other components of the 
blocking time can also be found in moving block. On most lines, the total of these other com-
ponents is much greater than the part of the blocking time that can be eliminated by moving 
block. That is why, compared with fixed block operation with short block sections, moving 
block will just lead to a moderate improvement of capacity. On lines with mixed traffic of 
trains running at different speeds, the possible improvement is almost negligible compared to 
a system with short block sections. Same is true for single lines with bidirectional operation. 
That is, why many railways prefer the principle of virtual block in new developments of radio 
based cab signalling systems. 
2.3 Block Control Principles 
To ensure safe train separation, the control procedures must ensure that the movement au-
thority to enter a section of line must not be issued unless two basic conditions are in effect: 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202006161443-0
Railway Signalling Principles   33 
 
    
 
 The line is clear up to the desired authority limit and the rear end of the last train 
ahead is safely protected by that limit. 
 All opposing moves on the same stretch of line are safely locked out. 
While these basic safety requirements are valid both in fixed block and moving block sys-
tems, the solutions to meet these requirements differ. 
2.3.1 Block Control by verbal Communication 
On branch lines operated at a low speed and a very low traffic density, train movements may 
be protected just by operating rules under staff responsibility. This is based on verbal com-
munication by radio or telephone. For this, two principles exist: 
 Dispatcher-controlled operation 
 Train control by local operators 
Today, most lines of that kind have some kind of dispatcher control. The dispatcher is an 
operator responsible for train control on a longer stretch of line. The dispatcher communi-
cates with the train crews by radio. Points are manually operated by the train crews. Train 
crews report the arrival at stations or specific locations to the dispatcher who keeps track of 
all movements either by manually recording these messages on a paper train sheet or by 
entering them into a computer system. Movement authorities issued by the dispatcher are 
also transmitted verbally by radio and recorded manually. When a computer workstation is 
used, train locations and movement authorities are visualized on a computer screen. That 
control system is just an offline system controlled by the data manually entered by the dis-
patcher, however. On lines with a higher density of traffic, a simplified signalling system may 
be used as a safety overlay. In such a system, automatic block signals controlled by track 
circuits would protect occupied sections of line. Since there are no controlled signals, move-
ments authority has still to be issued verbally by the dispatcher. This is frequently used in 
North America where the traffic density on many lines does not justify the effort to install a 
remote control system.  
While less frequently used today, train control by verbal communication of local operators is 
still common on some railways. On such lines, all stations that limit a block section must be 
locally staffed. The local operators communicate by telephone and exchange control mes-
sages on trains entering and leaving the block section, and on direction control to protect 
opposing moves. The exchanged messages and the train movements are manually record-
ed. Movement authorities are usually issued by lineside signals controlled by the local opera-
tors. Under very simplified conditions, station are only equipped with home signals. Then, the 
authority to leave the station into the next section of line is given verbally, or by a hand or flag 
signal. 
In old British systems, block sections are protected by block instruments in conjunction with 
bell codes. Local operators offer and accept trains and report trains entering and leaving sec-
tion by bell codes. This is overlaid by block instruments to indicate the state of the block sec-
tion. There are coacting instruments at the entrance and the exit of section, which can only 
be operated from the exit side. These instruments are pure communication devices not inter-
locked with the signals. So, the basic principle is very similar to a systems based on verbal 
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communication. The telephone communication is just replaced by bell codes and block indi-
cations. So, this is not yet a block system with positive locking of signals in the sense of the 
next paragraph. That kind of block protection is no longer used in new installations. 
2.3.2 Block systems for Fixed Block Operation 
In mainline operations, the fixed block criteria are enforced by block systems that provide 
positive locking of signals in stop position as long it is not safe for a train to enter the block 
section these signals protect. Since block systems are only used to enforce fixed block oper-
ation on line sections between station areas, they are often referred to as line block systems 
(UIC, 2012; Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020). On station tracks between successive interlocking 
signals, fixed block operation is not enforced by a block system but by the interlocking sys-
tem when setting routes from signal to signal. This will be explained in Chapter 3. That is, 
why on many railways, station tracks between successive interlocking signals are not re-
ferred to as block sections.  
Block Working Principles 
To protect a train that has entered a block section against following trains, the signal at the 
entrance of the section is locked in stop position. The signal can be either a lineside signal or 
just a section limit (usually marked by block marker board) where a train must not proceed 
without cab signal indication. If converging lines lead into the same section, the block locking 
is in effect for all signals leading into that block section. After the train has completely left the 
block section including the overlap (if overlaps are required) and is protected by a stop sig-
nal, the block section is released. Now, a signal at the entrance of the block section can be 




Figure 2.13  Block protection of following movements  
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If the line just consists of one single block section, opposing moves can be easily locked out 
by locking all opposing signals in stop position before a signal to enter the section can be 
cleared. On a longer stretch of line that consists of several block sections, opposing moves 
are locked out by direction locking. A signal to enter such a stretch of line can only be 
cleared after the entire section has been locked for the desired direction. The direction lock-





Figure 2.14  Direction locking with non-symmetrical normal position 
 
In some systems, the direction locking releases after the entire section has been completely 
cleared of trains. In such a system, the direction locking is re-established when the next train 
of either direction is going to enter the single track section. Thus, no direction is cleared in 
normal state. This is also known as a block system with symmetrical normal position. In other 
systems, the direction locking remains in effect even after the last train has left the single 
track section. Only when a train is going to enter the section from the opposing side, the lock-
ing is switched to the other direction. Then, the new direction will be kept locked until another 
change of direction is required. This is known as a block system with non-symmetrical nor-
mal position (Figure 2.14).  
If direction locking with non-symmetrical normal position is used on a line section that con-
nects the control areas of different operators, two principles exist for controlling the direction 
change: 
 Direction change is initiated by the station that is currently holding the direction. 
 Direction change is initiated by the station that is requesting the direction.   
If the direction change is initiated by the station that is currently holding the direction, a pro-
cedure for offering and accepting trains must be established between the two operators. 
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Otherwise, the operator receiving the train would not be aware of the necessity to initiate a 
direction change. If the direction change is initiated by the station that is requesting the direc-
tion, the operator that is requesting the direction needs an indication on the control interface 
that the direction change is currently possible and not blocked by a cleared signal on the 
opposing station. Otherwise, in case of a failed direction request, the operator wouldn’t  see 
the reason. A procedure for offering and accepting trains is not necessarily needed but 
sometimes used to avoid traffic control conflicts.  
An alternative principle for protecting opposing movements is traffic locking, which is the 
standard solution in North America (Aubertin, 2018). There, automatic signals at bidirectional 
line sections between interlocking areas are cleared in normal state for both directions. When 
a controlled signal is cleared to leave an interlocking area, all opposing automatic signals up 
to the next interlocking area are ‘tumbled down’, i.e., restored to stop. The ‘tumble down’ 
procedure is triggered from section to section until the entire direction is blocked. Then, it is 
also no longer possible to clear an opposing controlled signal at the adjacent interlocking 




Figure 2.15  Principle of traffic locking 
 
Manual Block Systems 
In a manual block system, the block sections are not yet equipped with continuous track 
clear detection. The signals protecting the block sections are manually controlled by local 
operators. The stations are equipped with electric block instruments connected by a block 
line. After a train has entered a block section, the operator at the entrance of the section 
would restore the signal and operate a block instrument to lock the signal in stop position. A 
coacting instrument at the exit side of the section informs the next operator on the approach-
ing train. If the operator at the block entrance failed to operate the block instrument, a rota-
tion lock would lock the signal in stop position until it is properly locked by the block instru-
ment. When the train has left the section, the operator at the exit side would check train 
completeness by watching the rear end marker, restore the signal to stop, and operate the 
block instrument to release the block section. This will release the block instrument at the 
entrance of the section, so that the signal at the entrance is no longer locked in stop position. 
To prevent the operator from accidently releasing a block section when the train has not yet 
left the section, an electric lock prevents operation of the block instrument at the exit side 
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until the train has passed through a short track circuit beyond the signal. So, these coacting 
block instruments work exactly in accordance with the block cycle as shown in Figure 2.13.  
On lines with bidirectional operation, direction locking can also be effected by coacting block 
instruments on both sides of the single track section. At the station that is not holding the 
direction, signals pointing against the locked direction are locked in stop position by a block 
instrument. To change the direction, the operator at the station currently holding the direction 
would operate a block instrument that will lock the signals in stop position and release the 
block instrument at the opposing station. The stretch of line between the two stations may 
contain several block sections. To change the direction, it is checked that all block instru-
ments at intermediate block sections are in the normal position. This meets the principle 
shown in Figure 2.14.  
Today, most manual block systems work as so called semi-automatic block systems, which 
uses relay circuits instead of block instruments. In a semi-automatic block system, the block 
locking after a train has entered the block section is effected automatically. However, after 
the train has left the section, it has to be released manually by an operator. In modern control 
centres, semi-automatic block systems are often used at the interface to lines still equipped 
with old technology. 
Manual block systems as described above are also known as tokenless block. Another solu-
tion to protect single track sections is token block. It’s still frequently used on railways with 
roots in the British system. In its most simple form, every single track section has a physical 
token (e.g., a staff, key or tablet). Only the operator in possession of the token is allowed to 
authorise trains to enter the line. To change the permitted direction, the token is handed to 
the train driver to carry it to the opposing station.  
Further development led to electric token block systems. In such systems, corresponding 
control stations are equipped with token instruments electrically connected to each other. A 
determined number of tokens is assigned to every track section. Every train has to pick up a 
token to enter the section. As long as the total number of all tokens kept in the connected 
instruments equals the determined number of tokens for the section, it is possible to release 
exactly one token from either one of the two instruments. After having removed a token, all 
other tokens in both instruments are locked. When the operator at the opposing control sta-
tion has returned the token into the token instrument there, both instruments are released. 
After that, another token may be removed to authorise a train to enter the section. Since only 
one token can be released at a time, intermediate block sections are not possible.   
While being old technology, token block controls are also to be found in modern control cen-
tres where a token block line connects to the controlled area. Since there is no longer any 
local staff available, the token instrument is remotely released from the control centre and 
operated by the train crew. A new development is Digital Token Block (DiBloc). It works like a 
traditional token block system but with the token instruments no longer connected by an elec-
tric block line but by internet or digital radio. This is a very cost-efficient solution for branch 
lines with low traffic.  
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Automatic Block Systems 
In an automatic block system, block sections are equipped with automatic track clear detec-
tion to enable the signals to work automatically. An automatic signal will only clear if the en-
tire control length up to the clearing point beyond the next signal is clear and a train ahead is 
protected by a stop signal. To release a block section, a train must not only have cleared the 
section and – if required – the overlap, but must also have restored the next signal. This 
condition confirms that the train has safely passed the exit side of the block section. So, the 
safe block working does not only depend on the track clear detection but is overlaid by the 
block cycle of Figure 2.13. 
This improves the safety of automatic block systems based on track circuits. If the occupa-
tion of the block section disappeared due to a malfunction of the track circuit while the train 
has not yet left the section (e.g., if some dirt has gotten on the rails), the block section will not 
release. It will also not release if the train has left the section but failed to restore the signal at 
the exit side of the section to stop position due to a malfunction of the next track circuit. For 
automatic block systems working with axle counters, that safety procedure is automatically 
enforced, since the track occupation could never disappear without having the train passed 
through the counting point. Passing through the counting point will also safely restore the 
signal to stop.  
Concerning the control principle, automatic block systems can be divided into two classes 
(Figure 2.16): 
 Decentralised automatic block systems 




Figure 2.16  Decentralised and centralised automatic block systems 
 
In a decentralised automatic block system, the control devices are located in field cabinets 
directly at the block signals. These block signal cabinets exchange block control information 
either by an electric block line or through coded track circuits. After a train has left a block 
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section, the signal at the entrance of that section is immediately cleared. So, in normal state, 
automatic block signals that are not held down by direction locking are cleared no matter 
whether a train is approaching or not. On bidirectional lines where opposing moves are pro-
tected by direction locking, all signals pointing against the locked direction are locked in stop 
position. When a direction change is initiated, all signals are restored to stop. After the new 
direction has been locked, all signal pointing into this direction will clear. On bidirectional 
lines where opposing moves are protected by traffic locking, automatic signals of both direc-
tions are cleared in normal state and only ‘tumbled down’ to protect an opposing move. 
In a centralised automatic block system, the block control is part of the centralised control 
system that also controls the interlocking areas. Instead of exchanging block control infor-
mation, centralised block sections are treated similar like routes in an interlocking system 
(see Chapter 3). However, these ‘block routes’ do not lock any points or movably parts of the 
infrastructure. They are just part of the block control logic. Before a signal can be cleared at 
the entrance of a centralised block section, the block section has to be locked. After the train 
has passed the signal, it is restored and kept locked in stop position, until the train has re-
leased the block section. By locking the block section from the entrance side and releasing it 
from the exit side, that control logic also meets the principle of the block cycle shown in Fig-
ure 2.13.  
In normal state, all centralised block sections are released. Consequently, all automatic block 
signals on a centralised automatic block line are in stop position. By clearing a controlled 
signal to enter an automatic block line, the first block section will be locked. That block sec-
tion will trigger the next block section, and so on. So, all automatic block signals will clear 
ahead of the train. On lines with bidirectional working, opposing moves are protected by di-
rection locking. The direction can only be changed when all intermediate block sections are 
released.  
Depending on the rules of individual railways, block overlaps may be provided at automatic 
block signals. If block overlaps are used on automatic block lines, there are three different 
principles to provide overlap protection (Figure 2.17): 
 Signals placed at the overlap distance before the track clear detection limits 
 Separate track clear detection section for the overlap 
 Using the next block section as an overlap 
Placing the signals at the overlap distance before the track clear detection limits is the most 
simple solution. However, in such a system, the overlap beyond a signal is not controlled by 
that signal but by the signal at the entrance of the block section. If a train has lost vehicles in 
the overlap, the lost equipment is protected by the signal at the entrance of the block section, 
while the signal at the exit side may clear not protecting the occupied overlap. This may be-
come a safety problem in degraded mode operations when a train is authorised to pass 
through a block section cautiously on sight. Then, the driver may encounter a cleared signal 
in front of the occupied overlap. To safely handle such situations, some railways established 
the rule that a train with authority to proceed on sight through a block section, has to continue 
in on sight mode after having passed a cleared signal at the end of the section for a specified 
distance beyond that signal. This is not necessary if the overlap gets a separate track clear 
detection section. Then, any occupation of the overlap will always restore the signal to stop. 
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On lines with very short block sections, an entire block section could be used as an overlap. 




Figure 2.17  Overlap solutions for automatic block lines 
 
Handling Block System Failures 
In case of a malfunction of a manual block system, degraded mode operation is based on 
verbal communication between local operators. When a train has left a block section, the 
operator at the exit side of the section would report the clearance of the section to the opera-
tor at the entrance side. Then, the operator at the block entrance may authorise the next train 
to pass the signal protecting the block section and report the departure to the operator at the 
exit side. On lines with bidirectional operation, the operators of the limiting stations would 
have to offer and accept every single train to protect opposing moves. All these messages 
are manually recorded. Before a train may be authorised to enter a line with bidirectional 
operation, the operator has to check in the train record that the last train ahead has the 
cleared the first block section and no opposing train has been accepted. 
On automatic block lines, that procedure is not possible due to the absence of local opera-
tors. For degraded mode operations, two different principled are used by individual railways: 
 Automatic block lines with absolute block working 
 Automatic block lines with permissive working 
On automatic block lines with absolute block working, the stop aspect on automatic block 
signals is absolute, i.e., it does not differ from the stop aspect on controlled signals. A train 
must not pass any signal in stop position without authority from the operator (absolute stop = 
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‘stop and stay’). In case of a block system failure, so that the operator has either to execute a 
resetting command to release the block section or has to authorise the train to pass a signal 
protecting a block section in stop position, the operator has to perform a clearance check for 
the relevant block section.  
For that clearance check, the operator has to clearly identify the last train that passed 
through the relevant block section. For that train, the following criteria have to be confirmed: 
 The train has arrived at a station beyond the relevant block section. 
 The train must be protected by a stop signal. This includes, if required, the clearance 
of the overlap beyond that signal. 
 The train must be complete. This is to be checked either by local staff or by the train 
crew. 
Before authorising a train to pass a stop signal to enter a block section on a line with birec-
tional operation, the operator has also to confirm that there is no opposing train on the entire 
section between the limiting controlled signals, and the opposing controlled signals protecting 
the section are secured in stop position.  
If train completeness of the last train ahead cannot be confirmed, the next train has to be 
authorised to pass through the relevant section on sight. If, in a case in which train com-
pleteness cannot be confirmed, the operator is going to reset the axle counter of a block sec-
tion under staff responsibility, the order to proceed on sight must be issued before the reset-
ting command is executed. If the resetting fails, the operator has to secure the signal protect-
ing the relevant section in stop position. Then, the operator is required to perform clearance 
checks for all following trains until a signal maintainer has reestablished normal working of 
the block system.  
If the operator cannot clearly identify the last train ahead, a clearance check is not possible. 
In such a case, the next train has to be authorised to pass through the relevant section on 
sight, but the operator must not reset the block section. Without having confirmation of the 
last train ahead, the operator cannot be sure whether a track occupation shown on the user 
interface is caused by lost equipment obstructing the track, a track clear detection failure, or 
by a 'forgotten' train that is still occupying the section. In the last case, resetting the block 
section may lead to a hazard if the forgotten train unexpectedly proceeds. On passenger 
lines, following trains with the same number of axles are a frequent occurrence. If a second 
train has occupied the section on sight after the axle counter has been reset, the unexpect-
edly moving first train may count out the same number of axles the second train has counted 
in. Thus, the section would clear while still occupied by the second train. For details see 
(Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020).  
The rule to perform a clearance check for each individual train will increase the workload of 
the operator and significantly decrease the capacity during degraded mode working. That is, 
why many railways use permissive working on automatic block lines.  
On automatic block lines with permissive working, only controlled signals have an absolute 
stop indication while automatic signals are permissive signals (Figure 2.18). A train may cau-
tiously pass a permissive signal in stop position after the train has stopped in front of the sig-
nal and the driver has clearly identified the signal as a permissive signal (permissive stop = 
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‘stop and proceed’). For that, permissive signals are marked by a special marker plate or by 
using a special kind of stop aspect. If a train has passed a permissive signal displaying a 




Figure 2.18  Absolute and permissive signals on automatic block lines 
 
On lines with permissive signalling, it is of great importance to restore a signal to stop with a 
very high reliability. If a signal fails to protect a train that has passed the signal, the signal at 
the block entrance would remain locked in stop position by the block system. If a following 
train passed that stop signal in permissive mode, that train would encounter a proceed as-
pect at the next signal leading into an occupied block section. In block systems where the 
required high reliability in restoring signals cannot be guaranteed, trains must run under the 
rule that a train running in permissive mode has to ignore a proceed aspect at the next signal 
and has to go on running permissive in the following block section. Only when the train has 
passed a proceed aspect at the second signal, the driver may end the permissive mode and 
proceed at normal speed.  
2.3.3 Block Control in Moving Block Operations 
Moving block systems need an accurate on board train location system that transmits the 
current location at very short intervals to a radio block centre. With every reported location, 
the train must also confirm train completeness. By these data, the radio block centre calcu-
lates the danger point to protect the rear end of the train.  
Between that danger point and the authority limit of a following train, there is a supplemen-
tary safety distance that is an equivalent to the block overlap in a traditional fixed block sys-
tem. It is the minimum safety distance kept between the two trains if the second train stops 
behind the first train. If points are going to be moved between two trains following each other 
in moving block, an additional time window for moving the points is needed. That time win-
dows is to be calculated by the radio block centre when upgrading the movement authority 
for the second train.  
The radio block centre will always safely prevent frontal crashes by locking out overlapping 
opposing movement authorities. On line sections outside of station areas where trains cannot 
reverse, an additional direction control is needed that works similar as the direction locking in 
a fixed block system. A train must not enter such section as long any opposing movement is 
travelling through that section or has authority to enter that section from the next location 
where the train sequence may be changed.   
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3 INTERLOCKING PRINCIPLES 
When passing through a point zone, beside safe train separation, movable track elements 
must be locked in the proper position, and the train must be protected against conflicting 
moves that would interfere with its path. This is effected by interlocking. The term interlocking 
comes from the fact that the signals governing train moves are interlocked with movable 
track elements and signals governing conflicting routes. 
3.1 Interlocking Routes 
Interlocking is based on the principle that before a train can be authorised to pass through a 
point zone by clearing a lineside signal or issueing cab signal authority, a safe route up to the 
authority limit is established. That route must meet the following conditions: 
 All points must be properly set and locked. 
 All points must be kept locked as long a train has authority to move on them. 
 Conflicting moves must be locked out. 
 The route must be protected against inadvertent movements on converging tracks 
(flank protection). 
 All track sections the train has authority to pass through, must be clear. 
3.1.1 Route Classes 
In modern interlocking systems, interlocked routes are also provided for shunting move-
ments. That’s why, there is a distinction between main routes and shunt routes. Main routes 
are routes for regular train movement governed by a main signal or cab signal indication. 
Shunt routes are used for shunting movements authorised by a shunt aspect or verbal au-
thority. Some of the requirements for a main route are not in effect for a shunt route. So, a 
shunt route may govern a shunting movement into an occupied track. Flank protection for 
shunt routes is usually either simplified or not required at all. 
In North America, where train movements are not as strongly separated from shunting 
movements, the same interlocking routes may be used both for train and shunting move-
ments. This principle is also used on some railways outside North America, e.g., in The 
Netherlands.  
A main route starts always at a controlled signal (the entrance signal of the route). The exit of 
a route can be: 
 The next controlled signal (the exit or destination signal of the route) 
 The end of the interlocking area 
Routes with an entrance and an exit signal are routes between successive signals within the 
same interlocking area. On railways where overlaps are required, the points within the over-
lap beyond the exit signal are interlocked with the entrance signal (Figure 3.1 a). Because 
the clearance of the section between the entrance and the exit signal is checked by the inter-
locking system, this kind of an interlocked route also directly ensures a safe train separation.  
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Figure 3.1  Interlocking routes 
 
Routes with the exit at the end of the interlocking area govern train movements to leave that 
area. Such a route cannot ensure a safe train separation. The route leads into a section of 
line that is protected by a block system. In North American interlocking systems, the route 
will always end at a controlled signal facing in the opposing direction that limits the interlock-
ing (Figure 3.1 b). In the North American terms, this signal is called an ‘exit signal’. That term 
should not be confused with the use of the term ‘exit signal’ for routes between successive 
controlled signals of the same direction as explained above. On Continental European rail-
ways, the exit of such a route is a track section beyond the last points of the route. In con-
trast to the North American practice, this route exit is not necessarily associated with an op-
posing controlled signal. On British railways, the exit of a route is always a signal. There, a 
route to leave an interlocking area and to enter an automatic block line leads up to the first 
automatic block signal. 
Figure 3.2 shows a more detailed view of the elements of a route between two successive 
interlocking signals. The details will be explained in the following sections. 
3.1.2 Point locking 
Before a signal can be cleared, all points and derailers must be locked in the proper position. 
The locking of points has two aspects: 
 To prevent the operation of the points 
 To prevent improper movements of the point blades under a moving train  
The first condition is guaranteed by the internal logic of the interlocking system. To meet the 
second condition, all points are equipped with a point lock apparatus that mechanically locks 
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the point blades in a proper position. Some railways use independent point locks, which are 
actuated by a separate control device from that which drives the points. More common are 










Figure 3.3  Design and working diagram of a claw lock mechanism 
 
A typical example is the claw lock which exists in several variations. Figure 3.3 shows a 
modern type which is very common in Continental Europe. As typical for all point locks of that 
kind, the point blades are not permanently connected but can be moved separately. When 
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the points are operated, the open blade moves at first while the closed blade is being un-
locked. Then, both blades move simultaneously, until the formerly open blade has reached 
the closed position. Now, the new open blade on the opposing side will move farther away 
from the stock rail, until the new closed blade is safely locked. 
Large turnouts with long flexible blades may have one or more additional point locks along 
the blades to hold them safely in place. These intermediate point locks are operated by a 
back drive that consists of a rodding mechanism driven by the point machine. 
Beside the point locking principle described above, some railways use a completely different 
kind of point locks, which are called internal point locks. By this principle, point locking is not 
effected directly between point blades and stock rails, but inside the point machine. For this, 
the point blades are permanently connected, so locking the driving rod in the point machine 
will hold them in place. To guarantee that the closed blade is firmly pressed against the stock 
rail, both blades must be kept at a fixed distance, which is enforced by so-called stretcher 
bars. 
3.1.3 Locking and releasing Routes 
After the train has passed the signal, all route sections must be kept locked until the train has 
cleared them or has come to a safe stop.  
On many railways, route locking is based on the principle of approach locking. As long no 
train is approaching, the route is just locked by the cleared signal. When restoring the signal, 
the route will immediately release. When an approaching train has reached a position at 
which cancelling the route would change a signal aspect in front of the train, the route will be 
approach locked. Now, after restoring the signal, approach locking will hold the route locked. 
After having passed the signal, the normal route locking comes into effect and will maintain 
all elements locked under the moving train. Some railways, in particular railways that follow 
German principles, do not use approach locking but establish full route locking immediately 
when clearing a signal independently from an approaching train. In Figure 3.4, both route 
locking principles are compared. 
The normal release of route locking is usually effected automatically after the train has 
cleared the points. The automatic route release can be accomplished by complete route re-
lease with one single clearing point, or by a sectional route release. For complete route re-
lease, the train must have cleared the entire point zone and must have occupied the destina-
tion track. Sectional route release requires track elements that may release separately to 
have separate sections for track clear detection. To prevent separately releasing track sec-
tions to be cleared before the train has passed through, they must have a minimum length 
that exceeds the maximum possible distance between two axles in the train consist. For 
safety reasons, separately releasing track elements are connected by a so-called sequence 
locking. This prevents the release of a track element until the previous element has released.  
Where overlaps are provided, points within the overlap are equipped with time release. They 
will release automatically with a defined delay after the train has occupied the last track sec-
tion on the approach of the route exit signal.  
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Figure 3.4  Route locking principles 
 
It may happen that a locked route has to be manually released under staff responsibility if the 
route has either to be cancelled without having a train passed or if the normal route release 
failed after the passage of the train. For the latter case, most railways provide an emergency 
route release. Route cancellations and the emergency route releases are protected either by 
time locking or by a specific command procedure with automatic recording.  
3.1.4 Conflicting Routes 
Routes that require points to be locked in opposite positions will lock out each other automat-
ically by the locked points. This is known as ‘conflicting locking’. If there is no difference in 
the position of the points of two conflicting routes, the interlocking between points and signals 
will not prevent conflicting movements. In such cases, a special interlocking function must be 
provided to lock out conflicting routes. Examples are opposing routes leading into the same 
track (also known as ‘opposing locking’) and routes with an intersection at a crossing without 
movable points (Figure 3.5 a, b).  
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Figure 3.5  Conflicting routes that do not differ in the position of points 
 
When a train has arrived on a station track and is going to proceed in shunting mode, many 
railways have the rule that the shunting authority must not be issued before the train has 
come to a stop. For this, a main route leading into a station track and the following shunt 
route lock out each other (Figure 3.5 c).  
3.1.5 Flank Protection  
Flank protection should prevent vehicles on converging tracks from running into a route that 
is cleared for a train movement. This could be achieved by: 
 Operating rules 
 Flank protection devices 
Flank protection by operating rules means that to protect a main route against inadvertent 
movements on tracks joining the path of the train, specific station tracks must not be used for 
shunting or for storing equipment as long the route is set. Since this form of protection is not 
very efficient, it should only be used when other forms of flank protection are not available.  
Flank protection devices are controlled trackside elements. Flank protection may be provided 
by flank points, derailers, or stop signals. Stop signals are only sufficient for flank protection 
against movements controlled by a driver. To protect a train against vehicles that could get 
into motion unintentionally (e.g., on tracks where equipment is stored), or against the flank 
hazard from tracks with heavy shunting, flank protection must be effected by flank points or 
derailers. On many railways, derailers must not be installed outside of sidings. For high 
speed lines, flank protection against shunting moves and parked equipment is always effect-
ed by flank points. 
Remote Flank Protection 
If possible, flank protection should be provided by elements that are directly adjacent to the 
route to be protected. If there is no suitable element available, flank protection could be pro-
vided by elements that are further away from the point to be protected. This kind of flank pro-
tection is called remote flank protection (Figure 3.6).  
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The points located between the protective elements and the points to be protected are called 
flank transfer points since they do not protect but transfer the flank protection. At flank trans-
fer points, the protective paths may split, so that one route element is protected by several 
protective elements. 
The flank area, also known as the flank zone (UIC, 2012), is the track section between a 
flank protection device and the fouling point of the route to be protected. When having a 
turnout in the flank area as shown in the example of Figure 3.6, the flank area splits into sev-
eral branches so that the fouling point of the route to be protected is protected by several 
protective elements. While the flank area must be kept clear of vehicles, there may be moves 
crossing through the flank area without harming the protected route (Figure 3.7). 
 
 




Figure 3.7  Crossing move through flank are 
 
Selective Protective Points 
A specific arrangement of flank protection are selective protective points, which are also 
known as dual-called flank points (Figure 3.8 a). These are flank points that may receive 
competing flank calls from the routes of different train moves. To prevent routes from locking 
out each other by the position of selective protective points, the protective position of these 
points is usually assigned to one of the two routes. To compensate for the lack of protection 
for the other route, that route will get remote flank protection. So, for that route, the selective 
protective points will become flank transfer points. 
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There are three different principles to control selective protective points: 
 Protective position permanently assigned to one of the two routes 
 Protective position flexibly assigned by priority control 




Figure 3.8  Dual called points 
 
When having the protective position permanently assigned to one route, the points will al-
ways be locked in the protective position by that route. While this principle is common prac-
tice in older interlocking systems, some railways keep using it in modern technology. The 
protective position of the selective protective points is usually assigned to the route of higher 
priority. In older interlocking systems controlled by locally staffed interlocking stations, the 
operator was often required to bring the selective protective points into the protective position 
also for the inferior route as long that route is set alone. This was not enforced by the inter-
locking, however.  
Priority-controlled flank protection provides more flexibility in assigning flank protection. As 
longs only one of the two routes is set, the selective protective points are moved into the pro-
tective position for that route. If the two routes are set at the same time, the selective protec-
tive points will move into the protective position for the route of higher priority. The superior 
route will even take away flank protection from the inferior route. Assigning flank protection 
by the ‘First In—First Out’ principle is the best solution if the two routes have the same priori-
ty. The selective protective points will always move into the protective position for the route 
that is set first.  
On railways that use selective protective points with flexibly assigned flank protection, it's 
common practice to leave these points unlocked as long they receive competing flank calls. 
Locked points will even release when called for flank protection by another route. This allows 
the operator to manually reassign the protective position. This is safe, since in such a case, 
there is always remote flank protection.  
As an additional feature, selective protective points with flexibly assigned flank protection 
could work in a ‘supplementary’ protective mode. After the route for which flank protection 
was provided has released, the selective protective points will automatically move to the pro-
tective position for the second route.  
Points may also get competing flank calls from just one route or from chained routes belong-
ing to the same train movement (Figure 3.9). Dual-called points of that kind are also known 
as self-selective protective points. In such a case, the protective position is either permanent-
ly assigned to one of the two points to be protected, or the self-selective protective points 
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Figure 3.9  Self-selective protective points 
3.1.6 Overlaps 
If overlaps are applied, the locked route exceeds the authority limit provided by a main signal 
or by cab signal indication up to a danger point to be protected. Within the overlap, conflicting 
routes are locked out to prevent a train running into the overlap from crashing into other ve-
hicles. Beyond home signals, the overlap is usually provided by placing the signal at the full 
overlap distance before the point zone. Then, it’s sufficient to check that the overlap is clear 
before the block section on the approach of the home signal is released.  
Inside station areas, there is usually not sufficient space to place exit signals and intermedi-
ate interlocking signals at the full overlap distance before the point zone. Then, points within 
the overlap are locked as part of any route leading to that signal. Also, conflicting moves 
passing through points or crossings within the overlap must be locked out.  
On some railways, home signals may also be placed directly in front of the arrival points with 
an overlap leading into the point zone. Then, at the braking distance on the approach of that 
signal, an ‘outer home signal’ is placed. The section from the outer home signal to the home 
signal is not part of the block system but controlled by an interlocking route. To clear the out-
er home signal, a route is set from the outer home to the home signal, which will lock the 




Figure 3.10  Example for the use of an outer home signal 
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This is sometimes done to shorten the distance between the home signal and following sig-
nals inside the station area for capacity reasons. It’s a typical signal arrangement on mass 
transit railway systems. A typical example is the New York Subway, where the outer home 
signals are called ‘approach signals’ (Dougherty, 2018). Another reason for outer home sig-
nals is to get a level crossing near the station area under protection of a controlled signal. 
Railways that do not use the term ‘outer home signal’ would simply call it a home signal and 
the signal in front of the arrival points an intermediate interlocking signal. 
Overlap rules quite differ between railways. Depending on the rules of individual railways, 
specific points in the overlap may remain unlocked to enable special overlap functionalities. 
Such special overlap principles are: 
 Selective overlaps 
 Swinging overlaps 
 Shared overlaps 
Where selective overlaps are provided, when setting a route, a choice can be made between 
different available overlaps. The alternative overlaps could be of different length or could lead 
into different tracks. Once the signal has been cleared, there is no chance to change the 
overlap without cancelling the route, however. When the selected overlap is shorter than the 
regular overlap, the train will be slowed down by the signalling system.  
Swinging overlaps mean that the overlap can be switched into another track without cancel-
ling the route. As long both overlaps are available, the facing points at the splitting point are 
unlocked (‘able to swing’). Swinging the overlap is no longer possible when the train has 
overrun the signal. Sometimes, it is already blocked when the arriving train has reached the 
last track clear detection section on the approach of the signal. This rule is usually applied if 
there is not a sufficient distance between the signal and the splitting point of the overlaps.  
As an alternative solution for selective and swinging overlaps, some railway do not require an 
overlap if the exit signal of the route is already cleared. When an approaching train should 
proceed at the exit signal on a route that would be locked out by the overlap beyond that 
signal, the route at the exit signal is set first. After having cleared the exit signal, the route on 
the approach of that signal can be set. It’s less flexible than selective or swinging overlaps 




Figure 3.11  Shared overlaps 
 
At shared overlaps, the overlaps of different routes may overlap each other without locking 
out the relevant routes (Figure 3.11). This is considered to be safe since it is not assumed 
that two trains would ever run into their overlaps at the same time. To enable shared over-
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laps, trailing points at which one overlap is joined by another overlap remain unlocked. These 
points must have trailable point locks.  
3.1.7 Intermediate Points 
Intermediate points are points that are located in a station track in a way that a train that is 
stopping at its regular stopping position would not clear the points (Figure 3.12). While the 
signal to leave the station track is located beyond the intermediate points, these points must 
be locked by a route starting at that signal. So, the route has a section located on the ap-
proach of the signal governing the route. When a train has arrived on the station track, inter-
mediate point are either released together with the overlap, or they are kept locked as long 




Figure 3.12  Intermediate points 
3.1.8 Track Clear detection 
For safe track clear detection of a turnout or crossing, the detection limit must exceed the 
fouling point limit by the maximum possible vehicle overhang ahead of the first axle. For 
standard gauge railways, the track clear detection limit is planned 6 m beyond the fouling 
point. If there is not sufficient space between adjacent turnouts or crossings to meet the 




Figure 3.13  Combining and separating track sections of separating points 
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If possible, the track sections of adjacent points and crossings may be combined into com-
mon track sections to spare track circuits or axle counters. This can only be done if no con-
flicts between independent routes are generated. Adjacent trackside elements must always 
be separated in the following cases (Figure 3.13): 
 If parallel routes are possible on these elements 
 If a signal is placed between these elements 
Separate track clear detection of adjacent points is also needed to prevent train moves from 
being blocked by occupied flank areas or by occupied flank points that cannot be moved to 
the protective position.  
3.2 Internal Logic of Interlocking Systems 
For the design of an interlocking installation, all locally relevant interlocking functionalities 
resulting from the principles described in the previous paragraphs must be put into a logical 
model. That model is used both as a planning document for the interlocking design for the 
given layout but also as a control logic for the internal control of the interlocking system for 
that layout. For that model, two principles exist: 
 Tabular interlocking 
 Geographical interlocking 
3.2.1 Tabular Interlocking 
In tabular interlocking, the interlocking conditions are described by a route control table (also 
known as a locking sheet, locking chart, or interlocking table). In that table, the rows repre-
sent the routes and the columns represent the interlocking conditions relevant for these 
routes. Figure 3.14 and Table 2 demonstrate the principle for a small junction with a single 




Figure 3.14  Infrastructure example 
 
In this example, Table 2 just contains route conflicts and point positions. A full route control 
table may have more columns for track clear detection, route locking and release criteria, 
and signal aspect sequences. Some railways establish separate tables for these issues, 
however. 
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Table 2  Route control table for the layout of Figure 3.14 
ROUTE ROUTES LOCKED OUT POINTS 
NORMAL REVERSE 
11-B1 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 12-A1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 
32-A1 
1, 2, 3, 4  
11-B2 11-B1, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 
12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2, 5 3, 4 
11-C 11-B1, 11-B2, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 
12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2  3, 4, 5 
21-B1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A1, 
12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
3, 4 1, 2 
21-B2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-C, 12-A2, 22-A1, 
22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5  
21-C 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 12-A2, 22-A1, 
22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2, 3, 4 5 
12-A1 11-A1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 
32-A1 
1, 2, 3, 4  
12-A2 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 
12-A1, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
3, 4 1, 2 
22-A1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 
12-A1, 12-A2, 22-A2, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2, 5 3, 4 
22-A2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A2, 
22-A1, 32-A1, 32-A2 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5  
32-A1 11-B1, 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 
12-A1, 12-A2, 22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A2 
1, 2  3, 4, 5 
32-A2 11-B2, 11-C, 21-B1, 21-B2, 21-C, 12-A2, 
22-A1, 22-A2, 32-A1 
1, 2, 3, 4 5 
 
In mechanical locking frames based on the traditional British system, a different principle is 
used, which is known as cascade locking. In a cascade interlocking system, a route is estab-
lished by a locking cascade, which is effected by permanent and conditional locking between 
different points and between points and signals. To set a route, the operator has to follow a 
predefined ‘lever sequence’ to get the route properly locked. That principle is no longer rele-
vant for modern interlocking systems, however. For the different notation of the locking 
sheets, see (Pachl, 2018). 
The contents of the route control table may be directly transformed into the software of a 
computer-based interlocking or into the wiring diagram of a relay interlocking. The internal 
logic of relay interlockings following this principle is also called ‘free-wired’ logic because 
every interlocking has its own specific wiring according to the control table. The shortcoming 
of tabular locking is that the route control tables may become very complex for larger layouts. 
In relay interlockings, the manual design of the relay circuitry based on the route control table 
may also become a very complex task. However, tabular interlocking is still a suitable princi-
ple for the design of interlocking systems for layouts of moderate complexity. It is also used 
in several computer-based interlocking systems. 
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3.2.2 Geographical Interlocking 
Geographical interlocking was first developed for relay interlocking systems to reduce the 
effort for designing complex interlocking layouts in free-wired logic. In geographical relay 
interlockings, the track elements are represented by pre-fabricated relay groups, i.e., boxes 
containing all relays needed to control a particular element including the wiring. The relay 
groups have sockets by which they can be connected by multi-wire cables in accordance 
with the track layout. By connecting the relay groups, the correct circuitry for a given layout 
will automatically appear. For specific functionalities, special plugs could be attached to the 
relay groups to modify the internal wiring. That simplified the design of complex relay inter-
lockings significantly. The signal planners were no longer required to manually design the 
electric circuitry. Instead, they established a diagram, in which the relay groups are repre-
sented by boxes that are connected by lines representing the multi-wire cables. For the spe-





Figure 3.15  Geographical interlocking 
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The same principle was later adopted for computer-based interlocking systems using a simi-
lar kind of diagrams. There, the boxes are longer relay groups but logical elements repre-
senting the track elements. Instead of plug IDs, numbers representing specific use cases are 
entered into the boxes.  
When a route is set in a geographical interlocking system, the entrance and exit elements 
are marked and a search current is started from the entrance element of the route. At facing 
points, the search current splits into two branches (Figure 3.15). The term ‘search current’ 
still comes from relay interlocking but is also used figuratively in computer-based interlock-
ings. The result is a tree structure of search currents. When one branch of the search current 
has found the exit element of the route, a response current is sent back to the entrance ele-
ment. At facing points, the other branches of the search current are deleted.  
After this process, a path has been found from the entrance to the exit. Conflicting routes are 
avoided automatically by the overlapping search currents. When different routes exist from 
an entrance element to an exit element, additional rules are used which route to select.  
All points in the route also send a search current for the flank call into the diverging track. 
Route setting can only be completed if the flank call gets a positive response from a protec-
tive element. On tracks where a protective elements does not exist, the search current must 
be reversed by a special (virtual) flank protection reverse element to generate a positive re-
sponse (Figure 3.16). In some interlocking systems, the elements of the points can be pro-




Figure 3.16  Flank protection reverse element 
 
The problem of selective protective points is solved by predefined rules, which determine 
how points shall react when dual-called for flank protection. The flank points will go into the 
protective position for the superior route while the flank call of the inferior route is forwarded 
to search for remote flank protection. In the example of Figure 3.17, point 1 is dual called for 
flank protection by points 2 and 3. Since the call from point 2 is superior, the inferior call from 
point 3 is forwarded. The flank search finally finds shunting signal 21X that will provide re-
mote flank protection. 
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In geographical interlockings, conflicting routes that do not differ in the position of points will 
automatically lock out each other if the exit elements overlap. Some railways allow opposing 
shunt routes leading simultaneously into the same track. Whether this is allowed or not usu-
ally depends on the length of the track. To enable such routes, the exit elements must be 
arranged in a way so they do not overlap (Figure 3.17). If, on shorter tracks, opposing shunt 








Figure 3.18  Locking out opposing routes by overlapping exit elements 
3.3 Generations of Interlocking Systems 
While computer-based interlocking is the dominating interlocking technology today and al-
most exclusively used in all new installations, older generations of interlocking systems are 
still in use. In some countries, they have still a significant share. 
Mechanical and Electro-mechanical Interlocking Systems 
Mechanical and electro-mechanical interlocking systems are controlled by leverframe ma-
chines, in which the levers of points and signals are mechanically interlocked. The develop-
ment of mechanical interlocking systems dates back to the late 19th century. In mechanical 
interlocking, points and signals are operated by the muscle-power of the local operator. The 
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levers are connected to the controlled track elements by mechanical wire or rod transmis-
sion. To compensate for the lack of an electrical monitoring of the point positions, facing 
points are often equipped with an independent point lock, which is operated by a separate 
lever. Since the maximum control distance of points is limited to about 400 m (for signals 
about 1200 m), large track layouts are often divided into different locally staffed interlocking 
stations. The first electromechanical interlocking systems were developed at the beginning of 
the 20th century. In electromechanical interlocking, points and signals are controlled either by 
electric motor drives or electro-pneumatic drives. The leverframe consists of miniature levers 
that are actually electrical switches but also still mechanically interlocked. Point positions are 
electrically monitored.  
While developed more than 100 years ago, there are still interlocking systems of that genera-
tion in use, outside the core network even in some developed countries. They are expected 
to disappear within the next decade, however. 
Relay Interlocking Systems 
In relay interlocking systems, the control logic is realised by relay circuitry without any me-
chanical elements. The circuitry may be based either on tabular interlocking with a free-wired 
logic, or on geographical interlocking. Points and signals are no longer operated by levers 
but by simple push buttons usually located in an illuminated geographical track diagram. The 
development of relay interlocking systems already started in the 1920s. They were the domi-
nating interlocking technology in the 2nd half of the 20th century. In many countries, they are 
still used in big numbers. In some countries, they are even still the dominating interlocking 
technology.  
Computer-based Interlocking Systems 
In a computer-based interlocking system, the control logic is represented by software. The 
first computer-based interlocking systems were developed in the 1980s. In the 1990s, for 
new installations, more and more railways switched from relay interlocking to computer-
based interlocking. On many railways, the track elements controlled by computer-based in-
terlockings have already outnumbered the elements controlled by older interlocking genera-
tions.   
Key Interlocking of Hand-throw Points 
Key interlocking is used to interlock hand-throw points at which a siding is connected to main 
track. It is a feature to be found in all generations of interlocking systems. For key interlock-
ing, hand-throw points are equipped with a key point lock for each position the points can be 
locked in. The key locks are designed in a way that the key can only be removed from the 
lock when the points are properly locked in the position that corresponds to that key. Some 
points may be equipped with double key locks designed in a way that by unlocking the points 
another key will be released to unlock other points.  
Normally, the key is held in an electric key device controlled by the interlocking system. 
When a route is set through the points, the key is electrically locked in that device. The elec-
tric key device is controlled by the interlocking system like a trackside element. The proper 
position of the points is checked by the presence of the corresponding key in the device. The 
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locking is effected by locking the key in the device preventing it from being removed to un-
lock the points.  
To enable a shunting move to go into the siding, the electric key instrument is released by 
the control centre (Figure 3.19 a). When having removed the key, a member of the shunting 
crew would open the lock to move the points of the main track turnout. This lock is often de-
signed as a double key lock releasing another key to open a flank point or a derailer protect-
ing the main track. After having cleared the main track, a member of the shunting crew would 
move the points to normal position, lock everything, and return the final key into the electric 





Figure 3.19  Example for key interlocking 
3.4 Handling Interlocking Failures 
If an interlocking signal doesn't clear as expected, there are three possible causes: 
 The route is rejected by the interlocking system. 
 The route is not rejected by the interlocking, but route setting has not been completed 
correctly. 
 For interlocking signals leading into a block section: The route is not rejected but the 
interlocking signal is locked by the block system. 
Before taking any action to bypass safety functions under staff responsibility, the operator 
has to clearly identify, which of the three situations is relevant. If the route is rejected by the 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202006161443-0
Railway Signalling Principles   61 
 
    
 
interlocking system, the operator has at first to check whether the route is still blocked by 
conflicting moves, by trackside elements manually locked on the user interface, or by locked 
trackside elements that have not correctly released after a train or shunting move has 
passed. If the route is still blocked by a conflicting move, the operator has to wait until that 
move has cleared the relevant track elements. If the route is blocked by trackside elements 
manually locked on the user interface, the operator has to check whether it's safe to remove 
the lockings or to wait until it will be safe to do so. If trackside elements have not correctly 
released after the last move, the operator has to check that the last move has safely cleared 
the relevant elements. Then it is safe to execute an emergency route release. The safety 
procedure to perform an emergency route release very depends on the operating rules and 
interlocking principles of individual railways. While some railways enforce emergency route 
release just by automatic recording, most railways delay the execution of the release com-
mand by time locking. 
If route setting has not completed correctly, the operator has to identify the track elements 
that prevent the signal from being cleared. Then, a safe route has to be established under 
staff responsibility. For this, there are three different cases: 
 Route locking is in effect and displayed on the user interface. 
 Route locking is not in effect but the position of all movable track elements is correctly 
indicated on the user interface. 
 Route locking is not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be 
checked on the user interface. 
If route locking is in effect and correctly displayed on the user interface, the operator may 
trust that all movable track elements are locked in the proper position. There is no need to 
apply manual lockings for trackside elements on the user interface. Before authorising the 
train to pass the interlocking signal in stop position, the operator just has to check that the 
track is clear or, if not possible, order the train to proceed through the route on sight. If route 
locking is not in effect, the operator has to bring all movable track elements manually into the 
proper position and secure them by applying manual lockings on the user interface. If route 
locking is not in effect and the position of movable track elements cannot be checked on the 
user interface, the relevant elements must be secured on site by applying mechanical key 
locks. In centralised operations, this is usually done by a maintainer who has to confirm that 
the elements have been secured in the proper position. The need for applying the lockings 
on site may lead to severe delays. In all cases in which route locking is not in effect, automat-
ic point setting must be switched off before authorising the train to pass the interlocking sig-
nal in stop position to prevent any points in the route to be moved unintentionally. 
In all cases in which a train is authorised to pass an interlocking signal leading into a block 
section in stop position, beside the procedures described here, the operator has also to apply 
the degraded mode procedures for the block system as described in the paragraph on block 
system failures. 
Sometimes, a need may arise to cancel a locked route without having a train passed. An 
example is a situation in which a signal has been cleared for a train to depart from a platform 
track but the train cannot depart due to an engine problem. In such a case, the operator has 
to restore the signal and to cancel the route. Another situation is a wrongly selected route. 
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This may occur by mistake of the operator or by a malfunction of the automatic route setting 
system. It is always safe to cancel a route as long no train is approaching the signal that 
governs the route. With a train approaching, before releasing the route under staff responsi-
bility, the operator has at first to reset the signal to stop. On railways where route cancellation 
of a route with a train approaching is not protected by time locking, the operator has to make 
sure that the train has safely come to a stop before releasing the route.  
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4 AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION 
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems transmit information on movement authorities and 
speed limits from the line to the train to initiate an automatic brake application if the train vio-
lates the valid limits. In train control with lineside signals, an ATP system works in addition to 
the lineside signals and with the main purpose of preventing trains from violating stop sig-
nals. On cab signalling lines, the ATP system provides the guiding information for the cab 
signal indication. 
4.1 Classification of ATP Systems 
Concerning the form of data transmission between track and train, there is a general distinc-
tion between intermittent and continuous ATP systems. In an intermittent ATP system, the 
data is transmitted to the train at discrete points along the track. Data transmission points are 
provided at signals and sometimes at selected intermediate locations between signals. While 
different solutions can be found in existing systems, the most commonly used solution is to 
use inductive transponders for data transmission. Intermittent ATP systems are mainly an 
add-on to lineside signals with the main purpose to prevent trains from overrunning stop sig-
nals. When approaching a stop signal, the train will get a first data transmission at the begin-
ning of the braking distance. That data transmission initiates a braking curve supervision 
forcing the train to slow down to a speed at which the train can be brought to a stop within 
the overlap distance. When violating the stop signal at that speed, the train will come to a 
stop before the danger point. When passing the signal after it has been cleared, the data 
point at the signal will upgrade the supervised speed in the on board unit. To avoid a nega-
tive impact on capacity by forcing trains to approach a cleared signal at a slow speed until 
the speed limit will be upgraded by the data point at the signal, additional data points may be 
provided on the approach of the signal. When passing such an infill data point after the signal 
has been cleared, the speed limit will be upgraded immediately.    
Continuous ATP systems transmit control data continuously from track to train. This enables 
the ATP system not only to protect but also to guide the train. The control data transmitted to 
the train is used for the cab signal indication. Lineside signals are no longer needed but may 
be provided for degraded mode operations. For data transmission, the following principles 
are used: 
 Data transmission by coded track circuits (pulse or frequency code) 
 Data transmission using a cable loop track antenna 
 Radio-based data transmission in combination with transponders for the purpose of 
train location. 
Today, a big number of different national ATP systems exists. Also, there are still railways 
that do either not yet have any ATP systems or just very simple ones. Today, there are three 
big international ATP project to replace older systems for better interoperability and to be 
used in all new installation: 
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 The European Train Control System (ETCS) 
 The Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) 
 The North American Positive Train Control System (PTC) 
Existing installations of older ATP systems are gradually replaced by systems covered by 
these projects. That is, why the following paragraphs concentrate on the principles behind 
these three system families. For a description of principles used in older ATP systems, see 
(Theeg & Vlasenko, 2020). 
4.2 European Train Control System (ETCS) 
For the European railway system, one of the big challenges is to improve interoperability. 
One of the key points to be solved in cross-border operation is the interoperability of ATP 
systems. While on European mainlines, ATP is a standard feature, the variety of existing 
ATP systems is enormous (Bailey, 1995). With a very few exceptions, ATP systems change 
at any national border. Today, the only solution for cross-border operation is either to change 
locomotives at national borders or to use expensive multi-equipped locomotives. To over-
come this situation, the ETCS project was launched. 
4.2.1 ETCS and ERTMS 
ETCS stands for European Train Control System and is a layer (i.e., a sub-project) of the 
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). While ETCS represents the train con-
trol part of ERTMS, other ERTMS layers deal with a train information system for tracking 
trains in international corridors, harmonised interlocking principles (still at a very early stage), 
and radio-based voice and data communication (Winter, 2009). The idea of ETCS is to grad-
ually replace the existing ATP systems by an advanced communication-based train control 
system. In that system, train control information can be transmitted by transponders (so-
called Eurobalises), short loop antennas (so-called Euroloops), or by digital radio. While the 
digital radio system is an ERTMS element outside the ETCS, it provides the wireless com-
munication needed in the higher ETCS levels. Today, ERTMS radio communication is still 
based on the GSM-R specification, which adds some specific features to the public GSM 
standard. Since GSM is already an outdated mobile communication standard, it will be re-
placed in the next years by the FRMCS (Future Rail Mobile Communication System), which 
is based on 5G radio technology. 
4.2.2 ETCS Levels 
Based on the different communication technologies, several levels have been specified for 
the trackside equipment (Stanley, 2011). By these levels, the ETCS can be adapted to differ-
ent operating needs. In all these levels, the same onboard equipment is used.  
ETCS Level 1 
In Level 1, ETCS works as an advanced intermittent ATP system. Train control information is 
transmitted by controlled transponders, which get their information from the traditional signal-
ling system via a lineside electronic unit (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1  ETCS level 1 
 
When approaching a stop signal, a transponder at the beginning of the braking distance will 
transmit a brake supervision curve to the train. The train will have to follow this curve until 
having reached a so-called release speed. At this speed, the signal can be passed. If the 
driver passes a stop signal at release speed, the train will get an emergency brake interven-
tion and brought to a safe stop within the overlap. The system guaranties that the train will 
never violate the danger point at the end of the overlap (the so-called supervised location). If 
the signal has been cleared in the meantime, the transponder at the signal will upgrade the 
onboard unit to the speed permitted in the section beyond the signal.   
To improve capacity, a train approaching a stop signal may be released from the braking 
curve supervision after the signal has been cleared by transmitting infill information. As 
shown in Figure 4.2, infill information may be provided by additional transponders (spot infill), 




Figure 4.2  Infill solutions for ETCS level 1 
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Within the Level 1, there are two sub-levels called ‘full supervision’ and ‘limited supervision’. 
In full supervision, the train speed is permanently supervised by the ETCS. If loop or radio 
infill information is provided at all points that may limit a movement authority, trains can be 
governed by cab signals without need for lineside signals. Without such infill information, 
lineside signals of some kind are still needed. After a train has stopped at a signal, the au-
thority to proceed cannot be transmitted by the ETCS. After the signal has cleared, the driver 
may proceed at release speed. When having reached the transponder at the signal, the lo-
comotive device will read the electronic movement authority and upgrade the cab display. 
This procedure does not require full-equipped interlocking and block signals. Instead, block 
marker boards with a single signal light indicating that the transponder contains a valid au-
thority are a sufficient solution (Figure 4.3). However, full-equipped signals may be provided 












Figure 4.3 ETCS block marker board with authority indicator  
 
In limited supervision, the ETCS emulates the functionality of a traditional intermittent ATP 
system. In this mode, trains are always governed by lineside signals while the ETCS super-
vision works in the background.  
ETCS Level 2 
In Level 2, ETCS works as a continuous ATP system in which the train control data is trans-
mitted by digital radio (Figure 4.4). Non-controlled transponders are used as reference points 
(‘electronic mileposts’) for the onboard train location system.  
In specified intervals, trains automatically transmit their location data to a Radio Block Centre 
(RBC) that issues the movement authorities to the trains. However, positive train separation 
is still effected by fixed block sections equipped with traditional track clear detection technol-
ogy (track circuits or axle counters). Lineside signals are not needed but may be provided for 
degraded mode operations. Most railways prefer to replace controlled signals by ETCS block 
marker boards that must not be passed without valid authority (ETCS stop board). Depend-
ing on the operating rules of individual railways, intermediate block sections may also be 
limited by block marker boards. Since these block marker boards do not provide an absolute 
stop indication, the design differs from the stop boards (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.4  ETCS level 2 
 
Some railways use the design of the stop boards with an additional ‘P’ marker which makes it 
passable, while other railways use a completely different design. Due to different rules for 
shunting movements, some railways use specific ETCS boards for vehicles running in ETCS 




Figure 4.5  ETCS Signage on a Level 2 line without lineside signals 
 
ETCS Level 3 
ETCS Level 3 finally adds train-borne checking of train integrity (i.e., train completeness) to 
the system. This eliminates the need for fixed block sections for track clear detection (Figure 
4.6). In contrast to Levels 1 and 2, ETCS Level 3 is not only an ATP and cab signal system 
but provides also a radio-based train separation replacing the traditional block system. De-
pending on the operational needs, train separation can be effected by virtual or moving 
block. 
With virtual block, virtual block sections are established in the control computer without hav-
ing real physical block sections on the line. The location information received from the trains 
by radio is transformed into information showing occupied and clear virtual block sections. 
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Movement authority is provided by allocating a number of block sections to a train. The end 









Figure 4.7  Virtual block and moving block 
 
Depending on traffic demands, the operational performance may be flexibly changed by re-
configuring the virtual blocks in the control computer. In a radio-based moving block system, 
a train clears the track behind its rear end in accordance with the tracking intervals of train 
location (Figure 4.7 b). Moving block makes only sense on lines with a very high density of 
one-directional traffic with harmonized speed profiles. In many cases, virtual block will be a 
more efficient solution.   
Due to the absence of traditional track clear detection technology, lineside signals for de-
graded mode operations cannot be used. Since a sufficient solution for train-borne checking 
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of train integrity has not yet been found, railway companies do not yet show serious interest 
in ETCS Level 3 at the moment. 
ETCS level STM 
The so-called ETCS Level STM was originally not a part of the ETCS specification but was 
added later. STM stands for Specific Transmission Module. It is a specific onboard device 
that enables an ETCS controlled vehicle to run on lines not yet equipped with ETCS but with 
an older ATP system. For this, the vehicles must be equipped with antennas needed to read 
information provided by the old system. In the STM, the data received from the old systems 
is transformed into the ETCS data format so the control information can be displayed to the 
driver on the ETCS user interface. However, the degree of control and protection very de-
pends on the capabilities of the old system. While having an ETCS user interface, the driver 
has to apply the rules of the existing systems. 
The STM level was developed as a temporary solution to support migration from old systems 
to ETCS. There are contrary arguments on the usefulness of this approach, however. The 
key objective of ETCS is interoperability without multi-equipped locomotives. The STM ap-
proach is still based on locomotives equipped with multiple antenna systems but reduces the 
need for a fast roll-out of trackside ETCS installations. This might finally not enhance but 
slow down the ETCS migration process. 
4.3 Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) 
For years, the Chinese railway network has been extensively growing. China already has the 
world’s largest high speed rail network. All new and upgraded lines are equipped with the 
CTCS – the Chinese Train Control System. The CTCS is based on ETCS technology with 
some modifications to meet the specific operational requirements of Chinese railways. For 
continuous transmission of train control data, either radio transmission by GSM-R or coded 
track circuits are used. For the use of coded track circuits, a separate level was defined that 
has no equivalent in the ETCS specification (Table 3).  
In this level, jointless frequency-coded track circuits are used. Location reference is provided 
by additional transponders of the Eurobalise type. The continuous data transmission by the 
coded track circuits may be supported by intermittent transmission by controlled transpond-
ers. Table 3.3 compares the numbering of ETCS and CTCS levels.   
Table 3  Comparision of ETCS and CTCS levels 
Functionality ETCS CTCS 
Intermittent ATP Level 1 Level 1 
Continuous ATP with coded track circuits - Level 2 
Continuous ATP with data transmission 
by radio 
Level 2 Level 3 
Continuous ATP with data transmission 
by radio and radio-based train separation 
Level 3 Level 4 
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CTCS level 2 may be used up to a speed of 250 km/h. Lines operated at a speed exceeding 
250 km/h must be equipped with CTCS level 3. CTCS level 4, which is an equivalent to 
ETCS level 3, is not yet in operation. However, since Chinese high speed lines are separated 
from the conventional network, there are some chances to have the first lines equipped with 
level 4 in the near future. 
4.4 Positive Train Control (PTC) 
Positive Train Control (PTC) is a concept from North America that is in some aspects similar 
to the ETCS, while other aspects are quite different. The objective of PTC is not to improve 
interoperability but to enhance safety. With just a few exceptions, the majority of the North 
American rail lines are not equipped with ATP. As stated earlier, a significant share of the 
lines are even ‘dark territories’, i.e., lines operated under simplified operating procedures 
without a signal-controlled operation. In 2008, as a consequence of several severe rail acci-
dents, US congress issued the Railroad Safety Improvement Act (often referred to as the 
‘PTC mandate’), which enforces the introduction of PTC. By the definition of that act, PTC is 
a safety system that prevents: 
 Train-to-train collisions 
 Overspeed derailments 
 Incursions into established work zone limits 
 Train movements through points in the wrong position 
Installation of PTC is mandatory on main lines with passenger traffic, on lines with a high 
traffic density, and on lines with regular transport of hazardous materials. 
On signal-controlled lines, trains are provided clear and safe track sections by the signalling 
system. The only function to be added by PTC is a continuous ATP system for speed control 
and enforcement of the authority limits. This is very similar to the philosophy of ETCS level 2. 
However, PTC can also provide an integrated protection of following trains based on the 
moving block principle. This is quite similar to the approach of ETCS level 3. 
A significant difference from ETCS is the protection of hand-throw points on unsignalled 
lines. For this, point positions are monitored to prevent trains from running through turnouts if 
the points are not properly set. That function is nonexistent in ETCS, since even the most 
simplified ETCS applications are always based on interlocked points with centralised control. 
Different from ETCS, PTC is not a technical specification but a set of safety functions defined 
independently from technology. Interoperability is not mandatory. The degree of interopera-
bility will depend on the needs of the railway companies. The four leading Class I railways 
(Union Pacific, BNSF, CSX, Norfolk Southern) have already agreed on a common standard 
to ensure an interoperable systems design. The technology will be based on radio based 
train control similar to ETCS levels 2 and 3. Different from these ETCS levels, PTC can be 
used either as a system to govern train movements directly, or as an overlay system to exist-
ing train control systems. Another difference from ETCS is the use of GPS as the primary 
train location system. 
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PTC may be implemented in three different levels: 
 Non-vital overlay 
 Vital overlay 
 Vital stand-alone 
When PTC is used as a non-vital overlay, trains are still governed by conventional systems 
(signal indications or verbal authorities). PTC just acts as a safety overlay in the background. 
In a vital overlay PTC implementation, trains are governed by PTC while the block and inter-
locking functions are provided by conventional CTC. As a vital stand-alone system, PTC will 
replace the conventional CTC systems and integrate all signalling and train control functions 
into one system. All currently planned PTC project follow either the non-vital or vital overlay 
approach. Technology for vital stand-alone PTC systems is not yet available.  
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5 LEVEL CROSSINGS 
At level crossings, rail traffic has absolute priority. While the design differs a little from coun-
try to country, a St. Andrew’s cross is used everywhere to mark a level crossing for road us-
ers. Depending on the traffic density on the road and the characteristics of the railway line, 
different protection measures are used.   
5.1 Level Crossing Protection 
Concerning the protection measures, there are three types of level crossings: 
 Level crossings without traffic light protection 
 Level crossings protected by traffic lights without barriers 
 Level crossings protected by traffic lights with barriers 
Level crossings without traffic light protection are just marked by a St. Andrew’s cross. Road 
users must have a clear view on the railway line to be able to stop safely when a train is ap-
proaching. For this, an approaching train must be clearly visible from a distance at which a 
road user approaching the level crossing can make a clear decision whether or not it will be 
safe to pass the level crossing. That distance includes the braking distance and a sufficient 
reaction time for the decision making of the driver. The distance from the decision point on 
the road and the needed approach distance on the railway line form a viewing triangle that 
must be kept clear of any view-blocking items. That triangle is calculated both for a slow and 
for a fast road user. The two triangles are put one above the other to get the entire area that 
must be kept clear (Figure 5.1). Additionally, trains approaching the level crossing would 
warn road users by repeated whistle signals. This very simple form of protection is only ac-




Figure 5.1  Viewing triangles for a fast (1) and a slow (2) road user 
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On level crossings protected by traffic lights, stop lights for road users are activated when a 
train is approaching. Depending on the national road traffic regulations, the stop indication is 
given either by flashing or steady red lights. In some countries, the traffic light will at first 
show a yellow light and then switch to red. While in most countries, the traffic lights are just 
dark as long no train is approaching, in some countries, a clear indication is given (usually a 
green or white light).  
The traffic lights must be activated a sufficient time ahead of an approaching train so that 
road users that have already passed the beginning of the stopping distance can still safely 
pass the level crossing. This time is called the level crossing approach time (not to be con-
fused with the approach time in blocking time calculations). The level crossing approach time 
is calculated from the maximum time a road user needs from the beginning of the stopping 
distance until having cleared the level crossing by full vehicle length plus a safety margin of a 
few seconds. 
On level crossings protected by traffic lights with barriers, there is another constraint. When 
the traffic lights are activated, the barriers must not be closed immediately. After the traffic 
lights are activated, road users that have already passed the beginning of the stopping dis-
tance must still be able to pass through the open barriers. The so called pre-signalling time 
from activating the traffic lights until closing the barriers is calculated from the maximum time 
a road user needs from the beginning of the stopping distance until having cleared the barri-
ers by full vehicle length. The level crossing approach time is the total of that pre-signalling 
time, the time for closing the barriers, and a safety margin. On level crossings protected by 
full barriers, i.e., barriers blocking all lanes of the road, it must be checked that no road user 
is accidently locked between the barriers. This can be done either by operators checking the 
clearance of the level crossing visually (either on site of by remote cameras) or automatically 
by radar scanners. On level crossing protected by half barriers, the clearance of the level 
crossing is not monitored because the leaving lane is not blocked, so that road users cannot 
be locked in. 
5.2 Control and Monitoring of Level Crossings 
A level crossing protected by traffic lights or by traffic lights with barriers can be controlled in 
three ways: 
 manually controlled level crossings 
 automatic level crossings 
 level crossings controlled by the interlocking system 
Pure level crossing operators are almost extinct today. Level crossings controlled by a local 
operator are still to be found at locally staffed interlocking stations. There, the level crossing 
is usually interlocked with controlled signals. Level crossings may also be controlled by an 
operator in a control centre who monitors the level crossing by remote cameras. Sometimes, 
the level crossing protection is manually activated by the operator but automatically deac-
tivated by trackside devices after the passage of the train. 
At automatic level crossings, traffic lights and barriers are activated by trackside devices (rail 
contacts, track circuits) placed at the required distance on the approach of the level crossing. 
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After the passage of a train, trackside devices will also check that the train has cleared the 
level crossing so that it is safe to automatically open the barriers and switch off the traffic 
lights.  
Automatic level crossings may be monitored by a remote monitoring device, by a driver’s 
crossing indicator, or by a main signal. A remote monitoring device will check the proper 
working of the level crossing protection for any train passing. Also, the trackside devices for 
the detection of an approaching train are permanently monitored. If a malfunction is detected, 
the operator in the control centre will be alerted. Then, all trains must be given an order to 
pass through that level crossing cautiously until a signal maintainer has restored normal op-
eration.  
At level crossing monitored by a driver’s crossing indicator, a lineside indicator is placed at 
the braking distance on the approach of the level crossing. When approaching the level 
crossing, the train has to check the proper working of the level crossing protection by that 
indicator. If the traffic lights have been correctly activated by the approaching train, the driver 
will get an indication that the train may pass the level crossing without restrictions. If the pro-
tection was not correctly activated, the driver will get a warning indication to slow down the 
train and pass the level crossing with caution.  
At automatic level crossings monitored by a main signal, a main signal protecting the level 
crossing will only clear when the level crossing protection has been correctly activated by an 
approaching train. When, in case of a level crossing malfunction, a train has to be authorised 
by the operator to pass that main signal in stop position, the driver must be ordered to pass 
the level crossing protected by that signal with caution. On lines with bidirectional operation, 
a level crossing may be monitored by a main signal in one direction but by a driver’s crossing 




Figure 5.2  Calculation of the initiation section 
 
Level crossings controlled by the interlocking system are part of an interlocked route and 
therefore interlocked with the signal governing the route. The level crossing protection is ac-
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tivated by the route setting and deactivated by the passage of the train through the level 
crossing. In case of malfunction of the level crossing, the signal governing the route will not 
clear. It shall be noted that there may also be automatic level crossings inside of interlocking 
areas. These level crossings are not part of interlocked routes but may be monitored by an 
interlocking signal.  
5.3 Calculation of the Initiation Section 
The initiation section is the distance at which an approaching train has to activate the level 
crossing protection. That distance depends on the monitoring principle (Figure 5.2). At re-
motely monitored level crossings, the length of the initiation section is calculated from the line 
speed and the necessary approach time. At level crossings monitored by a driver’s crossing 
indicator, the level crossing protection must be activated a sufficient time on the approach of 
the crossing indicator to enable the driver to watch the clear indication. The signal watching 
time is the same time as needed at a lineside signal providing an approach indication for the 
signal ahead as explained in Chapter 2 in the paragraph on the blocking time model. The 
initiation section is significantly longer than on a remotely monitored level crossing and will 
extend the time the level crossing is blocked for road users. At level crossings monitored by 
a main signal, the initiation section is extended by the distance between the main signal and 
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SYMBOLS IN DIAGRAMS 
The symbols for track and signal diagrams resemble the German standard but are used in a 
generic way not referring to a particular railway. 
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GLOSSARY 
Absolute signal - A signal that must not be passed in stop position without permission from 
the operator. 
Approach locking - Form of route locking that comes into force after the train has occupied 
the approach section. 
Approach time - 1) The running time between a signal that provides an approach indication 
and the following signal. 2) The time, level crossing protection must be activated ahead of an 
approaching train. 
Automatic block system - A block system in which the signals work automatically. Lines 
with an automatic block system must be equipped with track clear detection. 
Automatic signal - A signal that works automatically by the passage of the train through 
track sections. 
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) - A system that transmits information about movement 
authorities and speed limits from the line to the train to cause automatic braking if the train 
ignores the valid limits. 
Axle counter - A track clear detection system consisting of counting points at both ends of a 
section and a counter connected to the counting points. The occupancy of a section is de-
tected by comparing the number of axles that enter the section with the number of axles that 
leave the section. 
Block section - A section of track in a fixed block system, which a train may only enter if the 
section is not occupied by other vehicles. 
Block signal - A main signal that governs train movements into a block section.  
Block system - A signalling system that provides a safe spacing of trains. Block systems 
may be divided into fixed block systems and moving block systems. 
Blocking time - The minimum time interval that must be kept clear for the non-delayed pas-
sage of a train through a track section. 
Cab signaling - A signalling system that displays the movement authorities on the driver's 
desk. 
Clearing point - A point a train must have cleared completely before a signal in rear may be 
cleared or an interlocked route may be released. 
Controlled signal - A signal that is controlled by an operator. 
Control length of a signal - The length of track beyond a signal that must be clear and safe 
before the signal can be cleared for a train movement. 
Crossing - An intersection of two tracks at grade. 
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Derailer - A flank protection device that would derail an unsafe movement before it could join 
the protected route. 
Direction locking - A form of opposite locking in which a locked direction is established that 
holds opposing signals in stop position. Direction locking may be in effect on a block line that 
consists of several block sections. 
Distant signal - A signal that provides an approach indication to a signal but that cannot 
show a stop aspect. A distant signal does not limit a block section. 
Double slip - A crossing combined with four pairs of points to provide slip connections at 
both sides of the crossing. 
Driver’s crossing indicator - A lineside indicator placed at the braking distance on the ap-
proach of a level crossing, by which the driver can check the proper working of the level 
crossing protection. 
Dual called points - Another term for selective protective points. 
Dwarf signal - A ground mounted signal. 
Emergengy route release - A manually initiated release of a route or parts of a route if nor-
mal route release fails after the passage of a train. 
Entrance signal - An interlocking signal at the entrance of an interlocked route.  
Exit signal - 1) A controlled signal that governs train movements to leave a station track. It is 
also called a station exit signal. 2) A controlled signal at the exit of an interlocked route. It is 
also called a destination signal. 
Facing point movement - A movement on a pair of points in which the point blades face 
approaching traffic. 
Fixed block system - A block system in which the track behind a train is sectionally cleared 
in accordance with fixed block sections. 
Flank area - The section of track between a flank protection device and the fouling point of 
the route to be protected. 
Flank points - Points that are locked in a protective position to provide flank protection to a 
route. 
Flank protection - A measure to prevent vehicles from running into a route, which is cleared 
for a train movement. 
Flank protection device - A trackside element that provides flank protection. 
Flank transfer points - Points that are located in the flank area between an element that 
provides remote flank protection and the route to be protected.  
Fouling point - The limit of occupation of converging tracks at turnouts and crossings. 
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Geographical interlocking - An interlocking system in which the track elements are repre-
sented by logical objects connected to each other in form of the track layout. 
Headway - The time or distance interval calculated from ‘head to head’ between two succes-
sive trains. 
Home signal - 1) A signal governing entrance to an interlocking area. 2) A signal governing 
entrance to a station area. 
Initiation section - The distance at which an approaching train has to activate the level 
crossing protection. 
Insulated rail joint - A rail joint that ensures electrical insulation of adjacent rails to limit a 
track circuit. 
Interlocking - An arrangement of points and signals interconnected in a way that each 
movement follows the other in a proper and safe sequence. 
Interlocking signal - A controlled signal that governs a route within an interlocking. 
Interlocking station – A locally staffed control room from which an interlocking area is con-
trolled. 
Intermediate interlocking signal - An interlocking signal that is neither a home signal nor a 
signal that governs a route to leave the interlocking area.  
Intermediate points - Points that are located in a station track in a way that a train stopping 
at its regular stopping position would not clear the points. 
Intermittend ATP - An ATP system in which the data is transmitted to the train at discrete 
points along the track. 
Jointless track circuit - A track circuit that uses an AC audio frequency current, so that the 
working length is limited by the capacitive and inductive track characteristics without a need 
for insulated rail joints. 
Key interlocking - A method to achieve interlocking between signals and hand-throw points 
by mechanical key locks. 
Line headway - The headway that results from the blocking time stairways of two succes-
sive trains. 
Main route - An interlocked route governed by a main signal. 
Main signal - A signal that governs regular train movements. This term is used by many 
railways to distinguish these signals from shunting signals. 
Main track - A track that may be used for regular train movements.  
Manual block system - A block system in which the signals are controlled manually and the 
clearing of the block sections is checked by local operators watching the rear end markers. 
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Moving block system - A block system in which the track behind a train is cleared continu-
ously. 
Open line - Main tracks outside of station areas.    
Operator - An employee who is in charge to authorise train and shunting movements. 
Outer home signal - A controlled signal in approach to a home signal that does not directly 
protect points but that may be interlocked with points within the overlap beyond the home 
signal. 
Overlap - A certain length of track beyond a signal that must be kept clear as long a train 
movement is approaching that signal. 
Permissive signal - A signal that may be cautiously passed in stop position after the train 
has stopped at the signal. After having passed a permissive signal in stop position, the 
movement through the next block section must be made cautiously on sight. 
Point lock - A locking device that mechanically locks the points in a proper position to pre-
vent unintended movements of the point blades and movable frogs as long a train is running 
through the points. 
Point machine - A machine that drives points, movable frogs, or derailers. 
Points - The movable parts of a turnout that are moved to set different routes. 
Rear end marker - A marker at the rear end of a train. 
Relay interlocking - An interlocking system in which the interlocking is achieved by relay 
circuits. 
Remote flank protection - Flank protection that is provided by an element that is not directly 
adjacent to the route to be protected. 
Route cancellation - A manually initiated release of a route after having restored the signal.  
Route control table - A tabular sheet that contains all interlocking conditions for a given lay-
out. 
Route locking - The locking of all points and flank protection devices as long as a route is 
set. 
Route release - The release of locked points after the train has cleared the clearing point of 
a route. 
Running movement - Another term for a train movement. 
Selective protective points - Flank points that may receive competing flank calls from dif-
ferent routes. 
Self-selective protective points - Protective points that could receive conflicting flank calls 
from one train movement.  
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Semi-automatic block system - A block system in which the block locking after a train has 
entered the block section is effected automatically, but the section has to be released manu-
ally. 
Shared overlaps - A form of overlap protection in which two or more overlaps may share a 
track section without causing a route conflict.  
Shunt aspect - A proceed aspect allowing a shunting move to pass a signal. 
Shunting - All movements other than train movements. 
Shunting signal - A signal that is used to authorise shunting movements. 
Shunting limits - An area marked by shunting limit boards or signals, shunting movements 
must not leave.  
Shunt route - An interlocked route governed by a shunting signal or the shunt aspect of a 
main signal. 
Siding - A track that may not be used for regular train movements. 
Signal aspect - The appearance of a lineside signal, as viewed from the direction of an ap-
proaching train, or the appearance of a cab signal. 
Signal headway - The headway that results from the blocking times of two successive trains 
in a single block section  
Signal indication - The information that is given by a signal aspect. 
Single slip - A crossing combined with two pairs of points to provide a slip connection at one 
side of the crossing. 
Station area - An arrangement of station tracks limited by opposing home signals. 
Station exit signal - A controlled signal that governs train movements to leave a station 
track.  
Station track - A main track protected by controlled signals within an interlocking area on 
which trains may originate, terminate, pass, and turn.  
Swinging overlap - A form of overlap protection in which the overlap can be switched into 
another track without cancelling the route. 
Tabular interlocking - An interlocking system in which the locking between signals and 
points is achieved in form of a route locking table. 
Time locking - An application that will hold a route locked for a specified time after the signal 
has been manually restored. 
Token block - A block system for single track operation in which the movement authority 
depends on the possession of a token which is handed out to the train driver. 
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Track clear detection - A device that detects the occupation and clearance of a track sec-
tion. 
Track cicuit - A track clear detection device consisting of an electrical circuit of which the 
rails of a section form a part. The clearance of the section is detected by a detection device 
at one end of the section which receives a current from a source at the other end of the sec-
tion. 
Traffic locking - A principle of protecting opposing movements on automatic block lines on 
which automatic signals of both directions are cleared in normal state but automatically re-
stored to stop position (‘tumbled down’) by an opposing move. 
Trailing point movement - A movement on a pair of points where the frog faces approach-
ing traffic. 
Train movement - A locomotive or self-propelled vehicle, alone or coupled to one or more 
vehicles, with authority to occupy a main track in accordance to rules specified for train 
movements. 
Turnout - An assembly of rails, movable points and a frog, which effect the tangential 
branching of tracks and allows trains or vehicles to run over one track or another. 
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